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I. INTRODUCTION
A IRPORT EXPANSION PLANS are often opposed on envi-
1 onmental grounds. Regulatory agencies, such as the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA or Agency), must balance the
need to improve airport capacity with community concerns
about environmental impact. The National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA), which for over forty years has established the
environmental review procedures for airport development activ-
ities that receive federal funding, governs this balance. Similar
procedural requirements may exist under state law. Legal and
environmental challenges to airport expansion are typically
grounded in these federal and state procedural statutes. As this
article demonstrates, however, the ability of state legislatures
(and state courts) to restrict airport expansion for environmen-
tal reasons has decreased over time. As a result, environmental
plaintiffs are more likely to be forced to bring a NEPA challenge
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, which measurably stacks the deck
in favor of airport expansion.
This article presents a comprehensive study of the legal and
environmental challenges to airport construction and physical
expansion, focusing on the influence of the procedural statutes.
Each known court opinion since the enactment of NEPA was
reviewed and characterized with respect to the factual back-
ground, the form of the legal challenge, and the disposition of
the reviewing court. A statistical regression analysis was per-
formed to determine which factors significantly influenced a
court's decision to approve the environmental review or to en-
join airport expansion pending further environmental review.
The remainder of this Introduction provides background on
NEPA and its role in providing a framework for environmental
challenges to airport expansion, as the legal challenges have
evolved over time from common law nuisance claims to statu-
tory claims focused on analysis of environmental impacts, con-
sideration of alternatives, and discussion of mitigation measures.
Part II provides case studies illustrating these three prongs of a
NEPA analysis and the varying degrees of legal challenges that
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may be argued within each of the three prongs. Part III illus-
trates the jurisdictional hurdles that environmental plaintiffs
face, including the federal preemption doctrine as applied to
airport expansion. Part IV presents a statistical regression analy-
sis of all known judicial opinions, coded according to the court's
decision, the NEPA prongs, the jurisdictional defenses, and the
factual setting of each case. Part V recaps which forms of envi-
ronmental challenges are statistically most likely to succeed in a
given factual setting, suggests ways that environmental plaintiffs
can craft more effective legal challenges to airport expansion,
and suggests ways that agencies, such as the FAA, can improve
their environmental review of a proposed airport expansion to
withstand legal challenges.
A. PRE-NEPA ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES
As long as there have been airports, airport development met
with environmental legal challenges, which traditionally took
the form of nuisance complaints.' The maturation of the na-
tional airport system and the corresponding increase in use of
jet aircraft for passenger travel was accompanied by a matura-
tion of the form of the environmental challenge in the 1960s.
The form of the environmental challenge at the end of the
1960s, on the eve of the enactment of NEPA, is best illustrated
by the December 1969 opinion of the Chancery Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey in Township of Hanover v. Town of
Morristown.'
Since the early 1940s, the Town of Morristown owned and op-
erated an airport that was located in the adjacent Township of
Hanover.4 In 1960, Morristown submitted an airport layout plan
I See, e.g., Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 388 (Mass. 1930) ("I
find the plaintiffs are persons accustomed to a rather luxurious habit of living,
and while the noise from the airplanes in flight over their premises has caused
them irritation and annoyance, yet gauged by the [standards] of ordinary people
this noise is not of sufficient frequency, duration or intensity to constitute a
nuisance.").
2 See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 132 S.E.2d 188, 192-93 (Ga. 1963)
("Plaintiffs allege ... that the jet-propelled aircraft operations to and from the
airport have been carried on continuously since September 1959 and are ever
increasing; that these aircraft operations constitute a taking of an easement to
their properties for which they have not been compensated and in addition
amount to a nuisance which has injured their persons and properties.").
3 Twp. of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 261 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1969).
4 Id. at 694.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to the FAA, which called for the extension of one of its two run-
ways and other trafficable improvements, including new taxi-
ways.5 In 1967, Morristown requested construction funds from
the FAA to implement the airport expansion plan.6 Local mu-
nicipalities, including Hanover, challenged the planned expan-
sion on the basis that it would "result in irreparable, harmful
and adverse effects upon life in the surrounding communities.
' 7
At the time, the Federal Airport Act required the FAA, before
approving the plan, to ensure that the expansion was "reasona-
bly consistent with plans.., of public agencies for the develop-
ment of the area in which the airport is located" and to ensure
"that fair consideration has been given to the interest of com-
munities in or near which such project may be located."8 There-
fore, the FAA held a public hearing to consider the expansion
plan and afterward concluded that the expansion posed "no
substantial harm" to the surrounding municipalities because
"the anticipated noise after improvements would not reach
levels that would affect the health and comfort of ordinary peo-
ple living or working in the vicinity of the Airport."9 The FAA
subsequently approved the runway extension and provided half
of the construction funds.' ° The surrounding municipalities
brought suit against Morristown in state court, seeking a perma-
nent injunction against the runway extension.1
The court recognized that noise pollution from aircraft is "no
less an environmental pollution than the smog and smoke that
pollutes the air or the debris which poisons our lakes and riv-
ers." 12 It concluded that some of the planned uses of the ex-
panded airport were "manifestly incompatible with the ordinary
and expected comfortable environment" in the surrounding
communities.'" However, the court clearly struggled with com-
peting concerns of environmental protection and the potential
economic impact of an expanded airport. 4 The court declined
5 Id.
6 Id. at 695.
7 Id. at 698.
8 Federal Airport Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1108(d) (1), (3) (1964).
9 Twp. of Hanover, 261 A.2d at 695.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 693.
12 Id. at 696.
1 Id. at 705.
14 Id. at 701 ("The importance of the speed of travel to the corporate executive
must be placed on one side of the scale and balanced against the domestic tran-
quility to which family and the neighborhood are entitled.").
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to enjoin construction, concluding that the public interest in air
transportation precluded neighboring municipalities "from bar-
ring completely the normal growth of the Airport."1
Recognizing that it had "no expertise" in this area, the court
looked to the FAA for guidance as to how to reduce the environ-
mental impact of the airport expansion76 The court required
the airport to adopt specific mitigation measures proposed by
the FAA, which included a "preferential runway plan" allocating
use of the two runways as "one means of noise abatement" as
well as the installation of "noise suppression devices and noise
attenuation equipment" recommended by the FAA. 7 The court
also established procedural requirements for the airport, includ-
ing maintaining a log of all runway use, making the log available
for public inspection, maintaining evidentiary records of com-
plaints and corrective actions taken by the airport or the FAA,
and making those records available for public inspection.
18
Thus, while the court was unwilling to enjoin expansion of the
airport, it indicated that it would be willing to hear "claims
based upon detailed information" related to excessive noise aris-
ing from use of the expanded airport, suggesting that in the fu-
ture it might take action to mitigate such problems. 9
B. THE EMERGENCE OF NEPA
Less than a month after the opinion in Township of Hanover,
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).2o NEPA requires, for all "major [f]ederal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment," the
preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS), which
must describe "the environmental impact of the proposed ac-
tion," including "any adverse environmental effects which can-
not be avoided should the proposal be implemented" as well as
a description of "alternatives to the proposed action. 21 NEPA's
implementing regulations clarify that the EIS should describe
the environmental impact and discuss measures of mitigating
15 Id. at 702 (citing Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Hanover Twp.,
119 A.2d 761 (NJ. 1956)).
16 Id. at 697, 708.
17 Id. at 697, 707-08.
18 Id. at 707-08.
19 Id. at 707.
20 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-95 (2006)).
21 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
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that impact for both the proposed action and "all reasonable
alternatives." 22
Because the EIS is required only for actions that "have a sig-
nificant impact on the human environment," an agency can
avoid preparing an EIS by issuing a finding of no significant im-
pact (FONSI) .23 However, before doing so, the agency is re-
quired to prepare an environmental assessment (EA), which is
to contain "brief' versions of what would be required in an EIS,
including discussion of the "environmental impacts of the pro-
posed action and alternatives. 24
Once an agency has determined that an EIS is required, the
agency prepares a draft EIS, which is to meet all the require-
ments of a completed EIS to the extent possible, and then solic-
its input from the public and from other relevant agencies on
the draft EIS.25 The agency then prepares a final EIS, which
should respond to comments received regarding the draft EIS.26
If the action eventually taken deviates substantially from the pro-
posed action or one of the alternatives analyzed in the EIS or if
the agency becomes aware of "significant" new environmental
concerns that were not analyzed in the EIS, it is to prepare a
supplemental EIS.27
In many ways, NEPA is more notable for what it does not re-
quire than for what it does. Despite the requirement that an
agency consider all reasonable alternative approaches to meet-
ing its objective, there is no requirement in NEPA that the
agency select the approach that minimizes harmful environmen-
tal impacts.2 8 Despite the requirement to discuss mitigation
measures, there is no requirement in NEPA that the agency ac-
tually implement the mitigation measures. 29 Finally, despite the
requirement to supplement the EIS based on significant, new
environmental concerns, there is no requirement in NEPA that
the agency action, once taken, be undone if the actual environ-
22 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2010).
23 Id. § 1508.13.
24 Id. § 1508.9.
25 Id. §§ 1502.9(a), 1503.1.
26 Id. § 1502.9(b).
27 Id. § 1502.9(c).
28 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006); see
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-95.
29 40 C.F.R. § 1502.12; Clay Hartmann, Comment, NEPA: Business as Usual: The
Weaknesses of the National Environmental Policy Act, 59 J. AIR L. & CoM. 709, 720
(1994).
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mental impact of the action is worse than projected in the EIS.3 °
NEPA merely specifies procedural requirements that must be
met prior to taking action.3 ' Substantive environmental regula-
tion of the action is the province of other statutes.32
A number of states have adopted what are known as "little
NEPA" statutes, which require a similar procedure for evaluat-
ing state actions having a significant impact on the environ-
ment. These include the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA)33 and the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act
(MEPA) .' These statutes establish procedural requirements for
state agencies to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR),
which is analogous to the federal EIS. 5 Although there are dif-
ferences, which are discussed herein, the EIR has the same basic
content requirements as an EIS36: a discussion of environmental
impacts of the proposed action, an analysis of alternatives to the
proposed action, and a proposal to mitigate the environmental
impact of the proposed action and its alternatives.37 The follow-
ing Part illustrates how state and federal courts determine
whether the regulatory agency fulfilled its environmental review
obligations with respect to these basic procedural requirements.
II. CASE STUDIES
This Part examines legal challenges posed to airport expan-
sion based on the three major prongs of NEPA: analysis of envi-
ronmental impacts, consideration of alternatives, and discussion
of mitigation measures. Specific cases are discussed herein to
illustrate these three prongs and the varying degrees of legal
challenges that may be argued with respect to each prong of the
environmental review.
30 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-95.
31 Hartmann, supra note 29.
32 Id.
33 CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-177 (West 2007).
34 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 61 (West 2007).
35 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 61.
36 See, e.g., Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 0102731BLS2, 2003 WL
23163109, at *1 nn.4-5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003) (indicating that the re-
quirements for an EIR under MEPA and an EIS under NEPA are so interchange-
able that they can be combined into a single report).
37 CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21002.1(a) ("The purpose of an [EIR] is to identify
the significant effects on the environment of a project, to identify alternatives to
the project, and to indicate the manner in which those significant effects can be
mitigated or avoided.").
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A. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
The discussion of environmental impacts required by NEPA
"forms the scientific and analytic basis" of the environmental re-
view.3 8 The environmental impacts to be considered are de-
fined broadly to include "cultural, economic, social, or health"
effects in addition to ecological effects ("such as the effects on
natural resources and on the components, structures, and func-
tioning of affected ecosystems")." Perhaps because the require-
ment is defined so broadly, courts are highly deferential to an
agency's determination that it adequately analyzed the direct en-
vironmental impact of a planned airport expansion.4" This
places a substantial burden on opponents of airport expansion
to demonstrate that environmental impacts were not adequately
considered. The challenge often takes the form of either a criti-
cism of the scientific methodology used to predict environmen-
tal impacts or a complaint that concerns raised during the
environmental review were not addressed.41 Because courts will
defer to the agency's expertise as to technical details,42 these are
typically ineffective claims as long as the agency appeared to
take a "hard look" at the direct environmental impacts.4" Oppo-
nents of airport expansion, therefore, try to elevate the court's
scrutiny of the agency's environmental review by alleging that
the agency inadequately considered "indirect, secondary, or cu-
38 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (2010).
39 Id. § 1508.8.
40 See Andrew C. Mergen, The Changing Nature of Airport Environmental Litiga-
tion, 18 AIR & SPACE LAW. Winter 2004, at 1, 20-21 (Winter 2004) ("[A]irport
projects approved by the FAA and challenged in federal court are rarely en-
joined, and the Agency's environmental review and analysis is frequently ac-
corded considerable deference by the reviewing court.").
41 See id. at 21 ("Environmental lawsuits challenging FAA orders approving air-
port construction and enhancement projects routinely allege that the FAA's
NEPA documentation failed to adequately describe and disclose the effects of
aircraft noise on the surrounding communities.").
42 See, e.g., Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 8, 12, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2008)
("The FAA also responded thoroughly to specific concerns regarding [its] sound
analysis.... There was no regulatory requirement for the FAA to use any specific
model for this study."); Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d
678, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("The FAA's methodology was reasonable and ade-
quately explained .... The FAA's choice among reasonable analytical methodol-
ogies is entitled to deference from this court.").
43 Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 198 (7th Cir. 1986) (cit-
ing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
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mulative environmental impacts. 44 These types of challenges
are considered in turn.
1. Direct Environmental Impacts
The deferential standard of review for discussion of environ-
mental impacts is illustrated by a pair of early 1990s opinions of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit involving the con-
struction of Denver International Airport. In 1988, Denver an-
nexed land in neighboring Adams County and, with the
guidance of the FAA, prepared an EA for the planned new air-
port.45 On the basis of the EA, the FAA issued a final EIS in
1989 followed by a Record of Decision (ROD) constituting fed-
eral approval of the new airport.4 6 In 1990, the D.C. Circuit up-
held the EIS, despite finding that the FAA had improperly
assessed the environmental impact on a neighboring state park
and wildlife refuge.47 In determining that the new airport
would not have a significant impact on the park, the FAA relied
on noise guidelines for public parks, such as those for zoos,
amusement parks, and golf courses.48 The D.C. Circuit rejected
the FAA's methodology because the guidelines were focused on
the tolerance of people to noise during recreational activities and
"neglect[ed] altogether the effects of noise on wildlife and the
natural environment generally."49 However, despite the FAA's
apparent failure to consider these environmental impacts, the
D.C. Circuit upheld the EIS, largely by upholding the underly-
ing calculations that supported the FAA's conclusion.50 The EIS
incorporated detailed noise level predictions from the EA,
which indicated that the noise impact of the new airport on the
park was not expected to be dramatically different from that of
the existing airport that would be replaced.51 Although it im-
properly arrived at its conclusion, the FAA had included suffi-
44 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
45 Allison v. DOT, 908 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
46 Id. at 1027.
47 Id. at 1031.
48 Id. at 1028.
49 Id. at 1029 (emphasis omitted).
50 Id. at 1031 ("[I]n spite of its mistaken reliance on the noise level guidelines
contained in its regulations, the FAA has marshaled sufficient evidence to sup-
port its conclusion that the operation of the new airport will not result in a signif-
icant increase in noise levels . ).
51 Id. at 1030.
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cient detail of predicted environmental impacts for the EIS to
withstand judicial scrutiny.52
In 1992, with the airport under construction, Adams County
brought suit challenging the adequacy of the EIS on the issue of
air pollution and seeking to force the FAA to prepare a supple-
mental EIS.55 Adams County contended that the EIS was based
on incorrect assumptions about the baseline air quality level, as
air pollution had increased significantly since completion of the
EIS. 54 Furthermore, because the final design of the terminal
had not been complete at the time the EIS was prepared, Adams
County challenged the EIS on the basis that the subsequent
emissions permit for the terminal reflected higher anticipated
pollution levels than were assumed in the EIS. 55 Additionally,
the airport layout proposal had undergone changes since the
EIS was approved, including a relocation of the planned air
cargo facilities, and Adams County contended that the changed
layout proposal required supplementation of the EIS.5a Specifi-
cally, Adams County alleged that the changed layout would re-
sult in increased taxi distances for cargo aircraft, resulting in
increased emissions.57
In 1994, the D.C. Circuit again declined to order a supple-
mental EIS, despite what appeared to be a substantial deviation
from the construction plan considered in the 1989 EIS and new
evidence that the FAA's 1989 baseline pollution predictions
were incorrect. 58 Not surprisingly, the D.C. Circuit did not ad-
dress the change in anticipated air pollution levels from the
levels projected in the original EIS.59 NEPA is a procedural stat-
ute, and absent an allegation that the agency completely failed
to consider a significant environmental impact or based its anal-
ysis on assumptions that it knew to be incorrect or unreasona-
ble, the agency will not be forced to revisit the analysis based on
52 See id. at 1031.
53 Opening Brief in Support of Petition for Review of FAA Decision by Board
of Commissioners of Adams County, Colorado, City of Brighton, Colorado, &
City of Commerce City, Colorado at 4, 10,Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Isaac, 18 F.3d
953 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-1672, 93-1138), 1994 WL 16777254 (unpublished
table decision).
54 Id. at 20, 26-27.
55 Id. at 27.
56 Id. at 20-21.
57 Id. at 22-24.
58 Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 18 F.3d 953.
59 See id.
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data that becomes available later.6 ° It is more surprising that the
D.C. Circuit did not address the newly detailed terminal design.
It is commonly understood that there is a lower threshold of
environmental review required for approval of an airport layout
plan because an additional EIS will be required before the indi-
vidual construction projects contained in the plan are specifi-
cally approved" or because mere approval of an airport layout
plan does not necessarily indicate that the individual construc-
tion projects in the plan are funded or imminent.62 Here, how-
ever, the D.C. Circuit upheld an EIS for the airport layout plan
and did not require supplementation once detailed facility de-
signs became available.6
Most surprisingly, the D.C. Circuit elected not to require a
supplemental EIS despite significant deviations in the airport
layout plan from the original EIS. 64 The D.C. Circuit concluded
that an eighteen-page "[r]eevaluation" conducted by the FAA,
outside the prescribed NEPA review process, was sufficient to
conclude that the 1989 EIS was still "substantially valid. '6 5 The
FAA also hypothesized that the relocation of cargo facilities
could potentially result in decreased aircraft emissions as a re-
sult of reduced taxi distances.66 The reevaluation demonstrated
that "the FAA considered the relevant factors" in Adams
County's complaint (namely, the impact of the relocated facili-
ties on air pollution).67 Even though this analysis of environ-
mental impacts was not contained in the original EIS, the FAA
was not ordered to prepare a supplemental EIS.68
The Denver cases are illustrative of the deferential way courts
will review an agency's consideration of direct environmental
impacts of airport expansion. Absent a finding that the agency
acted in bad faith, courts tend to approve the agency's discus-
60 See Ogunquit Vill. Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243, 246 (1st Cir. 1977); see also 40
C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (2010).
61 See, e.g., City of Bos. v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698, 701 (D. Mass. 1975) (ap-
proving airport layout plan on conditional basis so that projects covered in the
EIS could be funded, but other projects in the plan, not covered in the EIS,
could not be funded before conducting a project-specific EA).
62 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 328 (9th Cir.
1975) ("FAA approval of an airport layout plan does not require an EIS.").
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sion of direct impacts even when the court finds that the
agency's methodology was flawed or that the agency's evaluation
has subsequently been proven incorrect.69 To overcome this ju-
dicial deference, opponents of airport expansion may argue that
the agency's obligation extends beyond consideration of the di-
rect environmental impacts and that the agency inadequately
considered indirect, secondary, or cumulative impacts of the air-
port expansion. These types of claims are considered in turn.
2. Indirect, Secondary, and Cumulative Environmental Impacts
Due to the highly deferential standard of review that courts
will apply to an agency's analytical methodology, particularly
with regard to airport expansion, it is unlikely that courts will
determine that an agency that has prepared either an EA or EIS
has inadequately considered direct environmental impacts, even
if the analysis is demonstrably faulty. Therefore, opponents of
airport expansion tend to argue for a higher level of judicial
scrutiny by claiming that the agency is required to look beyond
the direct environmental impacts of the planned expansion. A
challenge to the consideration of indirect or secondary environ-
mental impacts often takes the form of a claim that the expan-
sion will not simply increase airport capacity to match current
demand, but that there will actually be increased demand to use
the expanded airport.7" By arguing that the expanded airport
will actually induce growth, plaintiffs ask the courts to force
agencies to look beyond the immediate impact of the planned
expansion and to speculate about the environmental impact of
future construction, both on the airport property itself and in
the surrounding area, that would be a foreseeable consequence
of increased demand to use the expanded airport.71
A challenge to the consideration of cumulative impacts seeks
to hold the agency to an even tougher standard by asking the
court to force the agency to consider not just the incremental
impact of the planned expansion but also its effect in combina-
69 See id.; Allison v. DOT, 908 F.2d 1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
70 See JAYE PERSHING JOHNSON, LEGAL RESEARCH DIGEST 9: CASE STUDIES ON
COMMUNITY CHALLENGES TO AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT 9 (2010) [hereinafter ACRP
REPORT], available at http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acrp/acrp-Ird-009.
pdf (Plaintiffs argued "that the FAA failed to consider reasonably foreseeable in-
direct effect of the redesign because it did not adjust its forecast for the growth-
inducing effect of reductions in flight delay." (citing Cnty. of Rockland, N.Y. v.
FAA, 335 F. App'x 52 (D.C. Cir. 2009))).
71 See id.
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tion with all previous construction activity at the airport. 72 As
demonstrated herein, courts appear to be more sympathetic to
these challenges than to attacks on the agency's methodology
for calculating direct environmental impacts. This may be due
to judicial concerns that the airport could circumvent the envi-
ronmental review process by seeking incremental approval for
expansion projects rather than revealing the comprehensive ex-
pansion plan all at once, which would be more likely to trigger
the requirement for a full EIS. If courts were not receptive to
cumulative-impact challenges, airport expansion proponents
could presumably segment any planned expansion into a series
of piecemeal developments, any one of which standing alone
may have only a nominal or insignificant environmental impact,
and thus escape detailed environmental review. However, taken
to its extreme, a cumulative-impact challenge to airport expan-
sion would require the agency to balance the environmental im-
pact of the completed, expanded airport against the unspoiled
environment that existed prior to the airport's existence, since
any expansion activity is, by definition, an incremental addition
to the airport as a whole.
One of the earliest cumulative-impact airport cases was de-
cided by the U.S. District Court for New Hampshire in 1979. In
Citizens for Responsible Area Growth (CRAG) v. Adams, the city of
Lebanon planned an expansion of Lebanon Regional Airport
that included a runway extension, new taxiways, and a new ter-
minal, apparently in conjunction with its plans for a new indus-
trial park on adjacent property.7 3  The city undertook
construction of the taxiways without receiving federal funds and
applied separately to the Economic Development Administra-
tion (EDA) to fund the new terminal and to the FAA to fund the
runway extension." The FAA held a public hearing on the air-
port expansion proposal in May 1978, at which opponents of the
expansion project complained both about the impact of the
runway extension itself and the cumulative impact of the ex-
panded airport and the adjacent industrial park.75 The FAA
representative at the hearing informed the audience that the
FAA would prepare an EIS. 76 However, the FAA changed course
72 Id. at 11.
73 Citizens for Responsible Area Growth (CRAG) v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994,
997 n.2 (D.N.H. 1979).
74 Id. at 997, 1002 n.17.
75 Id. at 1001 n.14, 1005.
76 Id. at 997.
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after a private meeting with Congressman James Cleveland in
December 1978 and proposed instead to issue a FONSI or "neg-
ative declaration. ''v Likewise, the EDA issued a FONSI for its
portion of the airport development after reaching an agreement
with the city "to 'mitigate' certain adverse effects" via a plan yet
to be finalized .7  The EDA approved the grant, and terminal
construction was underway as of the trial date.79
The federal court flatly rejected EDA's deal with the city as an
attempt to bypass the required NEPA process.8 " Acknowledging
that there were adverse effects that needed to be mitigated was
an admission that the terminal development would have a signif-
icant environmental impact, and NEPA requires that those ad-
verse effects, as well as the potential mitigation strategies, be
documented in an EIS.8 1 The FAA, in turn, relied on the EDA's
finding that the terminal would have no significant impact in
order to issue a negative declaration for its portion of the air-
port development-the runway extension.8 2 As for the FAA's
FONSI, the court rejected the contention of the plaintiff envi-
ronmental group that the FAA inadequately responded to con-
cerns raised in the public hearing about the direct impact of the
runway extension. 3 However, the court agreed with the plain-
tiff that the FAA impermissibly considered the effects of the run-
way extension in isolation when determining that the project
would have no significant impact.8 4 In particular, the court
found it disingenuous for the FAA to contend that the runway
extension was a separate, discrete project unrelated to the other
ongoing airport construction. 5 The court enjoined "any fur-
ther undertaking which will advance development of the pro-
posed runway."86
With numerous concurrent expansion projects undergoing
isolated environmental review, the CRAG case illustrates an obvi-
77 Id. at 998.
78 Id. at 1004.
79 Id. at 997.
80 Id. at 1004 ("[T]he agency cannot bargain to waive NEPA compliance.").
81 Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2010).
82 CRAG, 477 F. Supp. at 1004 ("FAA's Draft Negative Declaration states a con-
clusion of no cumulative project impact based on the EDA's Negative
Assessment.").
83 Id. at 1005.
84 Id. at 1002 ("I conclude that in order to assess the significance of environ-
mental impact under NEPA, the projects must be treated as one.").
85 Id. at 1005.
86 Id. at 1006-07.
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ous segmentation challenge. Another common challenge re-
garding cumulative impacts involves speculation from plaintiffs
about the potential interaction between the planned expansion
and other past or future construction activities. In 2000, in
Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment
Agency, the California Court of Appeal first heard complaints
about the planned expansion of Mammoth Lakes Airport.87
Pursuant to CEQA, the Town of Mammoth Lakes prepared an
EIR for what it termed a "redevelopment plan," which included
extensions of the runways and taxiways and an expanded termi-
nal at the airport.8 8 However, the redevelopment program also
included development of a new industrial park as well as revitali-
zation of the downtown area. 9 None of these three areas were
adjacent to each other, and there was no obvious relationship
between the projects.9" However, by characterizing all the
projects as part of a single redevelopment program, the town
hoped to take advantage of a statutory provision that would per-
mit the EIR, once approved, to be immune from later challenge
of the individual projects.9' This type of "program EIR" is au-
thorized not by CEQA itself, but rather by its implementing reg-
ulations.9 The purpose of a program EIR is to "[e]nsure
consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a
case-by-case analysis."93 A program EIR is thus designed to en-
sure the analysis of cumulative impacts of discrete, but related,
construction projects, as typified by the CRAG case.
However, the Friends of Mammoth plaintiff environmental
group challenged the cumulative impacts analysis of the pro-
gram EIR as inadequate for CEQA purposes: "A legally adequate
'cumulative impact analysis' is thus an analysis of a particular
project viewed over time and in conjunction with other related
past, present and reasonably foreseeable probable future
projects whose impacts might compound or interrelate with those
87 Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redev. Agency, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 334, 339 (Ct. App. 2000).
88 Id. at 339, 341.
89 Id. at 339.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 345; see CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21090 (West 2007); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
14, § 15180 (2010).
92 CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 14, § 15180; Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
93 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15168(b) (2); Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 346.
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of the project at hand. 9 Here, the airport expansion did not
have any obvious direct relationship or interrelationship with
the other components of the redevelopment program, as evi-
denced by the fact that the town did not include the effects of
airport expansion in the program EIR's cumulative impacts
analysis."
Among other problems with the town's proposal, to qualify as
a redevelopment program, the area covered by the program had
to be "predominantly urbanized." 96 The town counted the en-
tire 202-acre airport site as "urbanized," which contributed sig-
nificantly to the proportion of the urbanized land area of the
redevelopment program.9 7 However, the airport site was actu-
ally located outside the city and was not adjacent to any urban
areas.9 8 Furthermore, most of the airport site itself was undevel-
oped.99 Characterizing this large area as already "urbanized,"
when it was actually largely undeveloped, effectively downplayed
the impact of the planned airport expansion, since expansion of
the airport would in reality reduce the amount of undeveloped
land at the airport site.
Also, by treating this diverse group of development projects as
a single program, the EIR analysis was focused primarily on "the
cumulative impacts that could foreseeably occur if all of the pro-
posed projects were actually developed" and "did not analyze
direct or indirect environmental impacts potentially caused by
each" individual project.100 Unlike the situation in CRAG, the
airport and industrial park in Friends of Mammoth were not con-
tiguous, and the cumulative impact of the two projects would
not be significantly different from the independent impact of
the two projects because here the projects were truly indepen-
dent.' By failing to evaluate the direct environmental impact
of the airport expansion independently, the EIR also "fail [ed] to
analyze the [true] indirect or secondary environmental impact"
94 Opening Brief of Petitioners and Appellants at 45, Friends of Mammoth, 98
Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (No. C029659), 1998 WL 34115815 (emphasis added).
95 See id. at 46.
96 Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 33030(b) (1) (West 2010).
97 Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352, 356-57.
98 Id. at 339, 357.
99 Id. at 356-57.
100 See id. at 341.
101 Compare id. at 339, with Citizens for Responsible Area Growth (CRAG) v.
Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 996-97 (D.N.H. 1979).
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that would result from it, such as additional development at-
tracted to the area surrounding the expanded airport.1
2
Shortly after the ruling from the California state court that
the program EIR failed to comply with CEQA, the town pre-
pared an EA for the airport expansion individually, concluding
that there would be "'no significant environmental impact
caused by the expansion of the airport that could not be satisfac-
torily mitigated.'" ''"3 Like the deal brokered by the EDA in
CRAG, this statement raised red flags due to what would appear
to be an improper conflation of the independent requirements
to evaluate environmental impacts and to discuss possible miti-
gation measures, all in an apparent attempt to circumvent the
NEPA procedure and avoid preparing an EIS. 1 4 Nevertheless,
the FAA adopted the EA and issued a FONSI. 105 Environmental
organizations and the State of California filed suit.106
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
was persuaded by "the volume of comments from and the seri-
ous concerns raised by federal and state agencies specifically
charged with protecting the environment" and the failure of the
town or the FAA to respond to the concerns raised-that the EA
failed to adequately evaluate the direct environmental impact of
the proposed airport expansion. 0 7 This alone should have
been sufficient to invalidate the FONSI, but the federal court
provided further support for its decision by proceeding to dis-
cuss in detail the EA's failure to evaluate indirect, secondary,
and cumulative impacts.1
0 8
Unlike the previous EIR, which defined the redevelopment
program too broadly, the EA's discussion of cumulative impacts
here limited itself to considering the airport expansion in con-
junction with other construction projects within the airport site
or contiguous to it.10 9 The EA did not consider the cumulative
impact of other related projects in the town's redevelopment
plan."0 Despite the fact that the earlier program EIR included
plans for increased hotel construction, residential construction,
102 Id. at 340, 343 n.5.
103 California v. U.S. DOT, 260 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting
the Administrative Record).
104 See id. at 971-72.
105 Id. at 971.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 973.
101 See id. at 974-78.
109 Id. at 974-75.
110 Id. at 975.
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etc. to support the expected increase in airline travel to the
town, the new EA reached the contradictory conclusion that the
town's existing residential properties could sustain the increase
in visitors that were expected with the expanded airport.'
Therefore, the EA did not consider the cumulative impact of
the airport expansion in conjunction with related residential de-
velopment. 112 The federal court also determined that the EA
failed to consider the indirect and secondary effects of ex-
panding the airport, such as the air pollution that would be
caused by highway traffic from additional visitors, as well as the
consequent additional burden that would be imposed on the
town's water and sewer systems." 3 The court enjoined "any con-
struction or other work on the airport expansion project pend-
ing conformance with all NEPA requirements, including
completion and adoption of an Environmental Impact State-
ment."'" 4 In a separate opinion issued the same day, the court
confirmed that the injunction extended to preliminary site
preparation, such as fencing and grading, rejecting the town's
contention that "these initial phases of the project would not
result in increased jet service or in adverse cumulative im-
pacts."' 1 5 Few concerns appear more likely to put an absolute
halt to airport expansion than a court's concern that an agency
or airport sponsor is obscuring the cumulative environmental
impact of airport development by ignoring past or foreseeable
related developments or otherwise segmenting the environmen-
tal review.
B. ALTERNATIVES
1. All Reasonable Alternatives
NEPA's implementing regulations indicate that the discussion
of alternatives "is the heart of the environmental impact state-
ment."'116 The agency is required to "[r]igorously explore and
objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives" to the proposed
action, including "the alternative of no action.""' 7 It has been
said that "[t] he most important function of agencies such as the
III Id.
112 See id.
113 Id. at 975-76.
114 Id. at 978.
115 California v. U.S. DOT, Nos. C02-4621 BZ, C02-4623 BZ, 2003 WL
21058179, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2003).
116 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2010).
117 Id. § 1501.14(a), (d).
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FAA in approving proposed actions under NEPA is analyzing al-
ternatives." '18 However, at least in the airport expansion con-
text, a challenge to the adequacy of the alternatives discussion
appears to be an especially ineffective tactic.'19 One exception
is litigation surrounding expansion of the Oakland Airport,
where both federal and state courts have upheld challenges
based on inadequate consideration of alternatives.
In California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Marsh, the Port of Oakland
sought to expand the air cargo facilities at the Oakland Airport,
including construction of a new commercial air terminal.120 In
1985, the port applied to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE or Corps) for a permit to fill 435 acres of wetlands on
which to construct the new facility.1 21 The Corps performed an
EA and issued a FONSI, indicating that an EIS was not neces-
sary. 1 2 2 Apparently due to concerns raised by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
and the California Department of Fish and Game, the Corps is-
sued an ROD approving a permit to fill only 180 acres but did
not revisit its earlier decision not to prepare an EIS.1 23 The
State of California challenged the Corps's decision on NEPA
grounds in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California.1 24 Although the federal court found that "[t]he
Corps reviewed alternatives to the proposed wetlands fill which
included decreasing the size of the project at the Airport,"'1 25 it
concluded that the Corps's review of alternatives was inadequate
because it did not include a discussion of all reasonable
alternatives:
The Corps did not evaluate the alternative of relocating some or
all of the air cargo project at nearby airports, including San Fran-
cisco International, and San Jose airport .... The Corps did not
consider changing the project to house only one of the air cargo
118 Hartmann, supra note 29, at 715.
119 Id. at 720 ("Although alternative analysis is the heart of an environmental
impact statement, case law will show that government agencies have failed to
treat it with the importance it demands."); see alsoACRP REPORT, supra note 70, at
11 n.92.





124 Id. at 497-98.
125 Id. at 498.
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companies who had requested space at the airport, and thereby
shrinking the impact on the wetlands. 126
The Port of Oakland was enjoined from further filling at the site
of the planned facility, and the Corps was directed "to prepare
an adequate EA or EIS.'1 27 This decision presents an interesting
contrast to the Denver airport litigation in 1994, where the D.C.
Circuit upheld the FAA's approval of the relocation of air cargo
facilities without a supplemental EIS and, thus, without any con-
sideration of alternatives. 128 It may be significant that the State
of California in Van de Kamp v. Marsh sought to enjoin prelimi-
nary site preparation, namely the filling of wetlands, and thus
brought suit against USACE rather than the FAA. 129 Because it
was not challenging an FAA order, the State of California was
able to bring suit in U.S. District Court rather than the U.S.
Court of Appeals.
130
In 1994, the port again sought to expand facilities at the Oak-
land Airport, including its new commercial terminal and its pas-
senger terminal, to increase its capacity for both passenger and
cargo aircraft.'13 As it began the CEQA review process, the port
announced that its environmental review would consider both a
"passenger dominant alternative" (expansion of the passenger
terminal only) and a "cargo dominant alternative" (expansion
of the air cargo facilities only).132 However, by the time the EIR
was completed in 1997, the port concluded that it was no longer
feasible to completely refrain from expanding either facility. 33
The final EIR included twelve other alternatives, including the
126 Id. at 499.
127 Id. at 501.
128 See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text; see also Opening Brief in Sup-
port of Petition for Review of FAA Decision by Board of Commissioners of Adams
County, Colorado, City of Brighton, Colorado, & City of Commerce City, Colo-
rado at 15, Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Isaac, 18 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-
1672, 93-1138), 1994 WL 16777254 (unpublished table decision) ("The environ-
mental reevaluation done by FAA does not conform to NEPA criteria, because no
alternatives were considered, there was no public comment, and no mitigation
measures are discussed.").
129 See infra note 346 and accompanying text.
130 See infra Part III.B (discussing original and exclusive jurisdiction).
131 See Respondent Port of Oakland's Brief in Response to Opening Briefs on
Appeal at 9, City of Alameda v. Port of Oakland, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598 (Ct. App.
2001) (No. A089660), 2000 WL 34028820.
132 Id. at 9-10.
133 See id. at 10.
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required "no project" alternative.' The Board of Port Commis-
sioners approved the EIR, and neighboring municipalities and
community groups brought suit under CEQA in the Superior
Court of California.1 35 in 1999, the state court found that the
EIR was inadequate because it failed to discuss the two alterna-
tives mentioned in the port's 1994 public announcement, de-
spite the port's subsequent determination that those alternatives
were no longer reasonable. 13 6 The EIR was also rejected be-
cause it failed to assess the cumulative impacts of potential fu-
ture projects (a new runway, a runway extension, and a new
taxiway) that had been under consideration as part of a draft
twenty-year master plan for development of the airport. 1 7 The
court enjoined further expansion of the airport until the EIR
was supplemented. 3 On appeal in 2001, in Berkeley Keep Jets over
the Bay Committee v. Board of Port Commissioners, the California
Court of Appeal upheld the judgment that the EIR needed to be
supplemented to include the two alternatives mentioned in the
1994 notice.3 9 However, the court held that the airport's "long-
range goal of expanded runway capacity is entirely speculative"
and that the potential runway projects were not "a reasonably
foreseeable consequence" of the terminal expansion project, so
failure to consider the cumulative effects of the runway and ter-
minal projects did not constitute improper segmenting or
"piecemealing."'40
What is troubling about this decision is that the port included
the planned runway extension and taxiway construction in its
discussion of the "no project" alternative but not in its analysis
of the proposed terminal project.14" ' The purpose of discussing
the "no project" alternative is to provide a baseline measure-
ment by which to compare the agency's proposed action to real-
istically determine its environmental impact in an incremental
134 Berkeley Keep Jets over the Bay Comm. v. Bd. of Port Comm'rs, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 598, 612 (Ct. App. 2001); Respondent Port of Oakland's Brief in Re-
sponse to Opening Briefs on Appeal, supra note 131, at 5 n.5.
135 Berkeley Keeps Jets over the Bay Comm., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 604, 608.
138 Id. at 604.
139 Id. at 602.
140 Id. at 612.
141 Id.
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sense. 142 Including speculative runway development projects in
the "no project" alternative would presumably result in a higher
predicted environmental impact associated with "no project,"
downplaying the apparent relative impact of the agency's pre-
ferred terminal expansion project. However, the state court re-
jected the notion that the port was required to include the
runway projects in its assessment of the environmental impact of
the terminal expansion project simply because it had included
the runway projects in its analysis of the "no project" alterna-
tive.' 4  The unfortunate dicta in this opinion-that it is not a
per se violation of the statutory procedures to consider specula-
tive future development activities in the "no project" alternative
that are not included in the agency's analysis of its preferred
action-could be used to dilute the purpose and meaningful-
ness of the "no project" alternative.' 44 The type of "no project"
alternative allowed in Berkeley Keeps Jets over the Bay Commission
clearly did not serve the purpose of providing a baseline mea-
surement by which to assess the true incremental impact of the
port's preferred approach to airport expansion.
The decision serves to illustrate the real weakness of a plain-
tiff's claim that an airport sponsor or agency has failed to ade-
quately consider alternatives to expansion. Although the
injunction was upheld pending supplemental discussion of alter-
natives, the implication was that the port would not have been
required to consider the "passenger dominant" and "cargo dom-
inant" alternatives if it had not itself suggested those two alterna-
tives in a public notice years earlier. 45 The influence of this line
of reasoning could be to convince agencies to limit their public
discussion of any alternatives prior to issuance of an EIS. How-
ever, it is noteworthy that the FAA had not approved or partici-
pated in the alternatives analysis that the state court deemed
insufficient in this case.' 46 This may be because the port de-
clined to pursue federal funding for the more environmentally
significant expansion projects (the runway, extension, and taxi-
way) because those proposals created "a great deal of contro-
142 NEPA requires alternatives to be presented "in comparative form, thus
sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options
by the decisionmaker and the public." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2010).
'43 Berkeley Keeps Jets over the Bay Comm., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
144 See id.
145 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
146 Berkeley Keeps Jets over the Bay Comm., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 n.4.
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versy" and "political problems.114 7 It is possible that involving
the FAA in the environmental review process would have re-
sulted in an EIR/EIS that more adequately considered alterna-
tives.14 8 It is almost certain that obtaining final FAA approval of
the proposed expansion would have resulted in a more deferen-
tial review of the discussion of alternatives from the federal judi-
ciary than the port received from the state court, particularly in
light of the determination that the rejected alternatives were not
feasible.149
2. No Possible, Feasible, Prudent, or Practicable Alternatives
Although NEPA requires an agency to consider all reasonable
alternatives to the proposed action, there is no express require-
ment in NEPA for an agency to select the alternative that will
least impact the environment, or even necessarily to justify its
preferred approach. However, other statutes dating back to the
time of NEPA's enactment have imposed more substantive re-
quirements for consideration of alternatives in the airport ex-
pansion context. The Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 (AADA), for example, declared that "any project involving
airport location, a major runway extension, or runway location,"
which was found to have a significant environmental impact, was
not to be approved by the FAA absent a determination "that no
feasible and prudent alternative exists and that all possible steps
have been taken to minimize such adverse effect. '1 5' Although
this would appear to impose a substantive requirement on the
FAA to demonstrate that it is not realistically possible to avoid
the environmental impact of the agency's preferred airport ex-
pansion plan, a review of the case law offers no indication that
courts ever seriously second-guessed the agency's preferred ap-
147 Id. at 608.
148 But see Shelby Angel, Comment, Airport Expansion-Costs vs. Environmental
Damage When Expanding Airport Facilities-The Eight Circuit Holds That All Reasona-
ble Alternative Solutions Need Not Be Explained in Great Detail in the FAA's Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement-City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 67J. AIR L. & CoM. 1009, 1013
(2002) ("If an alternative does not reach every aspect of the FAA's goals exactly,
then the alternative is considered unreasonable, and can be excluded from de-
tailed explanation. Notably, this allows the FAA to discard 'unreasonable' alterna-
tives, regardless of the environmental impact relative to the alternative chosen.").
149 See infra Part III.B; see also Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, 69 F. App'x 617,
622 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The agency need not consider all of the possible alternative
actions in the EIS; it is only required to look at those that are reasonable in light
of the project's stated purpose.").
10 Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c) (4).
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proach. Challenges that the agency rejected a feasible or pru-
dent alternative that would be less harmful to the environment
have practically never succeeded. 51
A case in point is the dispute between the States of Missouri
and Illinois in the early 1970s over a planned new airport to
serve the St. Louis area and relieve congestion at Lambert-St.
Louis International Airport in Missouri. 152 In 1970, the State of
Illinois created the St. Louis Metropolitan Area Airport Author-
ity (SMAAA) to develop a plan for locating the airport in Illi-
nois.15 3 In 1972, SMAAA selected a site in Illinois, and Illinois
applied for a federal grant to acquire the site. 154 Immediately
thereafter, the State of Missouri created the Missouri-St. Louis
Metropolitan Airport Authority (MSMAA) to study alternative
sites in Missouri and develop a plan for locating the new airport
in Missouri. 155 In 1974, Lambert-St. Louis Airport obtained a
federal grant to consider the alternative of accommodating the
expected growth in air travel demand by simply expanding. 56
In 1976, the FAA issued an EIS and ROD approving the Illinois
grant for a new airport. 157 Missouri challenged the EIS as inade-
quate, under both NEPA and the AADA, for failing to deter-
mine "that there were no 'feasible and prudent' alternatives to
the [Illinois] site. ' 58 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected that argument: "The fact is that alternative
sites were examined"-albeit by the Missouri plaintiffs to justify
either expanding the existing Missouri airport or locating a new
airport in Missouri-and the Missouri studies were available to
the FAA and were referenced in its EIS. 59 The federal court did
not express any opinion as to whether the record supported the
FAA's declaration that "no other site provides a feasible and pru-
151 See Angel, supra note 148, at 1014 ("By not requiring detailed explanations
about... feasible alternatives, the court creates a situation in which it is impossi-
ble to analyze . . . whether other alternatives would have been equally plausible
and more beneficial to the public .... " (citing N. Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skin-
ner, 903 F.2d 1553, 1542 (11th Cir. 1990))).
152 Missouri ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v. Coleman, 427 F. Supp.
1252, 1254-55 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Missouri ex rel. Mo.-
St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v. Adams, 564 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (unpub-
lished table decision).
153 Id. at 1254.




158 Id. at 1258.
159 Id. at 1260 n.33.
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dent alternative. ' 160 The fact that the FAA "considered a variety
of alternatives" was apparently sufficient to support its declara-
tion that none of those alternatives were feasible or prudent and
no review of that determination was warranted. 6 '
Successor legislation to the AADA, the Airport and Airway Im-
provement Act (AAIA), retains the requirement, as a condition
for federal funding, that "no possible and prudent alternative"
exists to a major airport expansion that will have a significant
impact on the environment. 16 2 However, as with the AADA, this
language does not appear, in the eyes of reviewing courts, to
impose a substantive requirement on airports or agencies be-
yond the NEPA procedural requirement to discuss all reasona-
ble alternatives. The FAA has avoided determining whether the
proposed expansion is the only prudent, possible, or feasible al-
ternative by successfully arguing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
that any activity short of a runway extension is not a major air-
port expansion,16 or where the activity is a runway extension, by
arguing that it has no significant environmental impact.164 Even
where the activity is a major expansion and the FAA acknowl-
edges significant environmental impacts, the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals have been satisfied by "evidence that the FAA carefully
considered a reasonable range of alternatives," and not that the
airport definitively determined that there were no possible, fea-
sible, or prudent alternatives.165 Therefore, despite appearing
to impose a substantive requirement that the agency demon-
strate that the consequences of the proposed airport expansion
are unavoidable, the courts treat this requirement with the same
deference that they treat the procedural requirement to con-
sider alternatives under NEPA.
a. State Courts: Less Deferential with Respect to "Prudent
Alternatives"?
State courts generally appear to be less deferential to state
agencies, in that they will require some evidence that there is no
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1) (B)
(2006).
163 Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
164 Federal Respondents' Brief at 13, Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. U.S.
DOT, 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-71268), 1999 WL 33631343.
165 See, e.g., Allison v. DOT, 908 F.2d 1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The FAA
need not examine an infinite number of alternatives in infinite detail.").
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possible, prudent, or feasible alternative to the agency's pro-
posed action where state statutes have that requirement. For ex-
ample, in Alaska Center for the Environment v. State, a challenge
was brought under the Alaska Coastal Management Act regard-
ing a planned major expansion of Ted Stevens Anchorage Inter-
national Airport.'6 6 An environmental organization sought to
prevent the dredging and filling of wetlands for the construc-
tion of multiple new runways, taxiways, and other facilities.1 67
The Supreme Court of Alaska noted that the state actually
elected not to locate some of the facilities in the wetlands area
based on a determination by the State Department of Fish and
Game that there may be "feasible and prudent inland alterna-
tives."16 However, the state argued that there was no feasible
alternative to locating the runways in the wetlands because the
runways would be "most effective and efficient if located close to
the existing airport infrastructure, ' 169 and all other land adja-
cent to the airport was either also in wetlands or was being used
as an Air National Guard facility.1 7' Thus, the state court upheld
the plan to dredge and fill the wetlands on the grounds that the
state had a "sizeable accumulated record of information" dem-
onstrating "the lack of alternatives for airport expansion. "171
The fact that the identified alternate locations might not be the
"most effective and efficient" location was apparently sufficient
to determine that those locations were not "feasible and pru-
dent," despite the fact that they would presumably present a less
significant impact on the wetlands environment.17 2
Similarly, in Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. California Coastal
Commission, an environmental group challenged a creek realign-
ment intended to support a runway extension at Santa Barbara
Municipal Airport under the California Coastal Act of 1976,
which required "the least environmentally damaging feasible al-
ternative.' 1 73 The California Court of Appeal determined that
the state marshaled substantial evidence, including multiple ex-
pert opinions, that the creek realignment "'involves the least en-
166 Alaska Center for the Env't v. State, 80 P.3d 231, 235 (Alaska 2003).
167 Id. at 235, 237.
168 Id. at 247.
169 Id. at 248.
170 Id. at 247.
171 Id. at 248.
172 See id. at 247-48
173 Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, Civil No. B178125,
2005 WL 2660048, at *2 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2005); see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 30236 (West 2007).
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vironmental disturbance, provides the greatest functional
reliability, and reduces flooding hazards."' 1 74 While both the
Santa Barbara Channelkeeper and Alaska Center for the Environment
courts purported to find that the agency affirmatively demon-
strated a lack of feasible alternatives, it is exceptionally difficult
to find an instance where a state court actually overturns an en-
vironmental review for airport expansion on the basis that the
agency failed to demonstrate that there were no feasible alterna-
tives. State courts typically balance the favorable environmental
features of the presented alternative against the effectiveness, ef-
ficiency, and "functional reliability" of the airport's preferred
expansion approach. 175 Therefore, it is hard to say whether
state courts seriously scrutinize the agency's consideration of al-
ternatives or merely pay lip service to the statutory language to
select "the least environmentally damaging feasible
alternative." '176
b. Federal Courts: Increasingly Deferential with Respect to
"Practicable Alternatives"?
Recent opinions in U.S. District Courts, interpreting similar
provisions in substantive federal environmental statutes, are un-
questionably highly deferential to agency determinations that
there are no practicable alternatives to the planned expansion.
In 2007, in National Mitigation Banking Ass'n v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois considered the plan to construct multiple new
runways at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport.177 In 2002,
the city of Chicago formally requested FAA approval, triggering
the NEPA environmental review process.1 78 Because the pro-
posed expansion involved the filling of wetlands, the city also
applied to the Corps for a permit under section 404 of the Clean
Water Act (CWA) 1 79 in November 2004.80 The Corps indicated
that an EIS would be required and that it was being performed
by the FAA."' 1 The FAA issued the EIS in July 2005 and subse-
174 Santa Barbara Channelkeeper, 2005 WL 2660048, at *4.
175 See, e.g., id.
176 Id. at *2.
177 Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 06-cv-
2820, 2007 WL 495245, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2007).
178 Id. at *2.
179 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
180 Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n, 2007 WL 495245, at "1, *3.
181 Id. at *4.
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quently issued a ROD approving the project. 8 2 In December
2005, the Corps issued the wetlands permit, adopting the FAA's
EIS and, based on the discussion of alternatives in the EIS, "con-
cluded that there were no practicable alternatives" to the expan-
sion plan that would have a less adverse impact on the
environment, as required by the CWA. 83 An environmental or-
ganization challenged the Corps' decision, arguing that the
CWA "practicable alternative" standard is stricter than the NEPA
requirement to consider all reasonable alternatives.' 84
However, the federal court took notice of the December 2003
enactment by Congress of the Century of Aviation Reauthoriza-
tion Act (Vision 100), which calls for a "coordinated environ-
mental review process for airport capacity enhancement
projects" and requires any federal or state agency participating
in the coordinated review process to "consider only those alter-
natives to the project that the [FAA] has determined are reason-
able." 8 5 Because the FAA determined in its EIS that alternatives
to the proposed expansion were unreasonable,186 "the Corps
was prohibited from considering them in further detail" when
deciding whether to grant the wetlands permit,'87 the CWA "no
practicable alternatives" requirement notwithstanding.' 8 While
this interpretation of Vision 100, if adopted by other jurisdic-
tions, would seem to significantly reduce the environmental re-
view requirements for airport expansion, at least with respect to
consideration of alternatives, the truth is that it is consistent with
interpretations of other statutes pre-dating Vision 100, including
the AADA and the AAIA, under which federal courts have tradi-
tionally been very deferential to agency preferences despite stat-
utory mandates that there were to be no possible, feasible, or
prudent alternatives less harmful to the environment than the
agency's preferred expansion approach.'89
182 Id. at *5.
183 Id. at *8; see 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2010).
184 Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n, 2007 WL 495245, at *18.
185 Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 47171(a), (k) (2006);
Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n, 2007 WL 495245, at *19-20.
186 See P.J. Huffstutter, FAA Backs Chicago Plan for O'Hare Airport Expansion, L.A.
TIMES, July 29, 2005, at 10, available at 2005 WLNR 23337080 ("In its [EIS], the
[FAA] said it had considered a number of proposals," but "decided that the city's
solution was the best way to decrease airport congestion while doing the least
amount of damage to the area's water and air quality.").
187 Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n, 2007 WL 495245, at *27.
ss Id. at *18.
189 See supra Part II.B.2.
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Today, even the identification of viable alternatives by the
lead federal agency can be insufficient to prevent a federal court
from overturning another federal agency's determination that
there are no practicable alternatives to the preferred airport ex-
pansion. A 2008 opinion by the U.S. District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Florida deferred to the Corps's determination
that there were no practicable alternatives to a proposed 8400-
foot runway despite the fact that the FAA determined that a
6800-foot runway would be sufficient. 190 In Florida Clean Water
Network, Inc. v. Grosskruger, the Panama City-Bay County Airport
Authority planned to relocate its airport from Goose Bayou to
West Bay County to provide for anticipated future passenger de-
mand.191 Because the relocation would involve filling wetlands,
the Corps participated in the coordinated environmental review
process at the FAA's request, with the FAA taking the lead
role. 19 2 Although the FAA determined that a 6800-foot runway
would meet the projected aviation demands, it nonetheless is-
sued an EIS and ROD approving the 8400-foot runway request,
but only providing funding for a 6800-foot runway. 19 3 The
Corps subsequently issued an ROD and wetlands permit based
on the FAA's EIS, concluding that there was no practicable alter-
native to the 8400-foot runway.' 94 An environmental organiza-
tion brought suit, contending that the FAA had identified one
practicable alternative-a 6800-foot runway. 95
The federal court agreed that the CWA imposes a higher stan-
dard than does NEPA with respect to the analysis of alternatives
in that it "directs the Corps toward selection of alternatives that
pose less detrimental environmental impacts." '196 Nevertheless,
the court upheld the Corps's determination that there was no
practicable alternative to the 8400-foot runway by speculating
that the Corps may have defined the objective of the airport ex-
pansion differently than the FAA did.'97 While the FAA may
have been correct that a 6800-foot runway would meet aviation
demand for the immediate future, the Corps may have based its
190 Fla. Clean Water Network, Inc. v. Grosskruger, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249
(M.D. Fla. 2008).
191 Id. at 1238-39.
192 Id. at 1239-40.
193 Id. at 1241, 1244 n.13.
194 Id. at 1241.
195 Id. at 1243, 1248.
196 Id. at 1243 n.1l.
197 Id. at 1245, 1248.
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determination on some unspecified longer term.1 98 The Corps
was only required to determine that the objective of providing
for longer-term growth was "legitimate" and then determine
that there was no practicable alternative to accomplish that legit-
imate objective. 99 This logic would seem to take the teeth out
of any statutory requirement that the least environmentally dam-
aging alternative be selected for accomplishing any government
action. As long as a course of action is not unreasonable, it
would seem that a "legitimate" government objective could be
defined in such a way as to ensure that there is no practicable
alternative that would be less environmentally damaging than
the agency's preferred course of action.2 0 0 The practical effect
is that the federal courts negate any legislative intent to impose
a higher substantive standard on the analysis of alternatives to
airport expansion, limiting the government agency's obligation
to no more than the minimal analysis required under the NEPA
"reasonable alternatives" requirement.
C. MITIGATION
1. Discussion of Mitigation Measures
Although the text of NEPA itself does not contain any require-
ment to discuss mitigation measures, the requirement arises
from NEPA's implementing regulations. The discussion of envi-
ronmental impacts of the proposed action is to include a discus-
sion of the "[m]eans to mitigate adverse environmental
impacts. 201 Likewise, the discussion of alternatives to the pro-
posed action is to include a discussion of "appropriate mitiga-
tion measures not already included in the proposed action or
alternatives. 20 2 The discussion is to include an analysis of the
effectiveness of the mitigation measures in reducing detrimental
impact on the environment.203 Notably, there is no require-
198 Id. at 1245.
199 Id. at 1248.
200 See Angel, supra note 148 ("[T] he FAA could establish any goal when de-
signing a project. If an alternative does not reach every aspect of the FAA's goals
exactly, then the alternative is considered unreasonable, and can be excluded
from detailed explanation.").
201 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (2010).
202 Id. § 1502.14(f).
203 Id. § 1502.16(e)-(g).
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ment in NEPA's implementing regulations that the agency or
airport actually employ any of these mitigation measures. °4
The requirement to discuss mitigation measures is illustrated
by Miami Sierra Club v. State Administration Commission, a 1998 de-
cision by the Florida District Court of Appeals that addressed
the planned conversion of Homestead Air Force Base into a ci-
vilian airport.2"' The Air Force prepared an EIS in conjunction
with its plans to transfer the land to Dade County, but it was
determined that a Supplemental EIS was required because the
county's development plans, including "an 887 acre airfield par-
cel, a 122 acre terminal parcel, and a 223 acre aviation area,"
were "far more expansive than the uses contemplated by the gov-
ernment's first EIS.' '216 In response to a challenge brought by
environmental organizations, the state court agreed that airport
construction could not proceed until mitigation plans related to
the airport's impacts with respect to noise, stormwater, and wild-
life habitat were completed and incorporated into a supplemen-
tal EIS.20 7
2. Challenges to Substantive Mitigation
Sometimes environmental plaintiffs challenge the mitigation
plan on grounds that go beyond the discussion required by
NEPA regulations. These legal challenges typically invoke sub-
stantive environmental statutes and allege that the proposed
mitigation plan prepared for NEPA purposes is inadequate for
the expanded airport to conform to the substantive law:
Surface water runoff from runways, contaminated with de-icing
chemicals and fuel exhaust, may violate the Clean Water Act
(CWA). The Endangered Species Act (ESA) may apply if expan-
sion or relocation of runways will destroy habitats. Aircraft emis-
sions impact air quality and must comply with the Clean Air Act
(CAA). Airports that are located near public parks .. .may vio-
204 See Jeffrey A. Berger, False Promises: NEPA's Role in Airport Expansions and the
Streamlining of the Environmental Review Process, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 279, 314
(2003) (" [T]he FAA needs only to discuss potential remedial measures and is not
required to develop a comprehensive mitigation plan before it can act.").
205 Miami Sierra Club v. State Admin. Comm'n, 721 So. 2d 829, 829 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998).
206 Id. at 830.
207 Id. at 831.
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late the Department of Transportation Act because of noise pol-
lution or other environmental impact.2 8
For example, in Caliornia ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Marsh, the
State of California challenged a plan to fill wetlands to construct
a new commercial air terminal at the Oakland Airport.20 9
USACE performed an EA and issued a FONSI, determining that
the 180-acre fill would not result in a significant loss of wet-
lands.21" The state challenged this conclusion, claiming that the
mitigation plan in the EA was inadequate and that the ex-
panded airport would violate the CWA and the CAA.211 The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California en-
joined the planned wetlands fill on the grounds that there were
no "contractual obligations" or other "binding agreement" to
force the airport to abide by the Corps's mitigation proposal.212
The federal court therefore determined that "the Corps violated
NEPA's requirements ' 213 despite the fact that NEPA is com-
monly understood to merely require a discussion of potential
mitigation measures, not a commitment to undertake them.
By determining that NEPA imposed substantive mitigation re-
quirements, the court was able to avoid considering the state's
claim that the expanded airport would violate either the CAA or
the CWA.2 14 Challenges to airport expansion on the basis of
these substantive federal laws are typically ineffective because
agency decisions under those statutes are only overturned if ar-
bitrary or capricious. 21 5 However, challenges in state courts that
the expanded airport will fail to conform to substantive state en-
208 Wendy B. Davis & Rebecca Clarke, Hot Air: Undue Judicial Deference to Federal
Aviation Administration Expertise in.Assessing the Environmental Impacts of Aviation, 69
J. AIR. L. & COM. 709, 711 (2004) (citations omitted).
209 California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Marsh, 687 F. Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
210 Id.
21 See id. at 500-01.
212 Id. at 501.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See, e.g., City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. EPA, 435 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir.
2006) ("It was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Corps Defendants to" grant
CWA permit for new runway at Cleveland airport, finding that "the project would
not contribute to a significant degradation of the waters of the United States.");
Steele Creek Cmty. Ass'n v. U.S. DOT, 435 F. Supp. 196, 199 (W.D.N.C. 1977),
affd, 570 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1978) (unpublished table decision) (upholding FAA
approval of a new runway at Charlotte airport under arbitrary and capricious
review, finding that "[t]here has been no demonstration of a violation of a stan-
dard under the [CAA]").
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vironmental laws appear more likely to succeed. For example,
in Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands, the Oregon Supreme
Court upheld the denial of a permit to fill wetlands to extend a
runway at the North Bend Airport, noting that the state fill-and-
removal law required positive measures to "mitigate the loss of
estuarial resources."216 In McCain v. County of Lassen, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals upheld an injunction against runway
construction, where excavation and grading would violate the
state mining law, which was intended "to prevent or minimize
adverse environmental effects of mining operations. "217
3. Minimizing Environmental Impact
Where plaintiffs introduce substantive environmental law into
the debate, the argument is that the airport expansion propo-
nent is required to do more than simply present a mitigation
plan-it must actually implement mitigation measures that re-
duce the environmental impact of the proposed expansion to a
level that conforms to substantive environmental law.218 Occa-
sionally, opponents of airport expansion argue that these envi-
ronmental statutes impose even stricter substantive mitigation
requirements-that environmental consequences must be "min-
imized. ' 219 Taken literally, this is an argument that near-total
mitigation is required, so that the net environmental impact of
the proposed expansion will be de minimis or insignificant after
mitigation.220 Often, these claims are brought under state "little
216 Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 710, 715 (Or. 1979) (en
banc).
217 McCain v. Cnty. of Lassen, Nos. C036601, C038265, 2003 WL 123065, at *2,
*5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003).
218 See Michael Schneiderman, Streamlining Environmental Review: Myth or Real-
ity: Changing Compliance Procedures to Speed Runway Approval, 15 AIR & SPACE LAw.
Winter, 2001, at 1, 18 (describing federal statutes that impose "substantive stan-.
dards with respect to avoidance and mitigation of environmental harms caused
by projects supported by FAA grants," and state statutes that "impose standards
and procedures different from, and sometimes more demanding than, federal
law").
219 See, e.g., Fla. Clean Water Network, Inc. v. Grosskruger, 587 F. Supp. 2d
1236, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
220 See, e.g., MatthewJ. Christian, Proliferation and Expansion of America's Airports
at the Expense of its Treasured Parks and Preserves: Judicial Perversion of the Term "Use"
in Section 4(l) of the Department of Transportation Act, 3 NEV. L.J. 613, 616, 629
(2003) (describing the requirement for an airport to "have only a de minimus
effect on nearby parks" under section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation
Act, which requires "all possible measures that can mitigate the detrimental ef-
fects the project will have on the park" (citations omitted)).
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NEPA" statutes, which often include language that would ap-
pear to impose such strict substantive requirements in addition
to the procedural requirements.
For example, the substantive requirements of MEPA have
been periodically invoked to challenge runway construction at
Logan International Airport in Boston.22 Section 61 of MEPA
requires that "all practicable means and measures" be taken "to
minimize damage to the environment. ' 222 In 1974, the Massa-
chusetts State Environmental Affairs Department challenged the
failure of the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) to pre-
pare an EIR prior to beginning construction on a new runway
and the extension of two others.2 3 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts upheld the trial court's finding, despite Mass-
port's issuance of a FONSI, that "residential areas might suffer
from significant increases in noise exposure" as a result of the
runway project.224 Because there would be a significant environ-
mental impact absent mitigation, Massport was required to pre-
pare an EIR, complete with substantive mitigation plan, to
demonstrate that it "had met its obligation under [section] 61 to
minimize damage to the environment. ' 225  Massport subse-
quently completed an EIR in 1975 but it was rejected by the
state environmental affairs department for failing to comply
with MEPA.22 6 In 1976, further construction on the new runway
was permanently enjoined.227
In 2001, Massport was again planning a new runway at Logan,
where the runway layout had remained largely unchanged for
twenty-five years due to the 1976 injunction. 2 8 This time, Mass-
port prepared an EIR, which received approval from the state
environmental affairs department "subject to Massport's obliga-
tion to implement certain mitigation measures pursuant to [sec-
tion] 61 of MEPA. '' 229  In 2003, the Superior Court of
221 See, e.g., Matthew Brelis, Runway Plan Clears Key Hurdle Opponents Vow to Chal-
lenge Logan Project, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WLNR
2273319.
222 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 61 (West 2007).
223 Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs v. Mass. Port Auth., 323 N.E.2d 329, 333, 338 (Mass.
1975).
224 See id. at 341.
225 Id. at 343.
226 Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 012731BLS2, 2003 WL 23163113, at *2
(Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003).
227 Id. at *3.
228 Id. at *1 n.9.
229 Id. at *5.
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Massachusetts, noting that Massport would "be required to im-
plement mitigation measures," modified the 1976 injunction to
allow the new runway to be constructed. 23 0 However, the court
retained jurisdiction until such time as it was able "to tell
whether Massport will comply fully with MEPA's requirements in
terms of implementation of the [section] 61 commitments" to
minimize environmental damage.231
While the Massachusetts cases are somewhat remarkable in
their imposition of near-total mitigation requirements on air-
port expansion, requirements to "minimize" or "eliminate" ad-
verse environmental impacts under other state "little NEPA"
statutes have been used with limited success to challenge airport
expansion. 232 But this near-total mitigation requirement should
not be overlooked as a challenge that is only available to plain-
tiffs in a few states. Federal airport funding statutes have long
contained similar language. For example, the AADA of 1970 re-
quired that "all possible steps have been taken to minimize such
adverse effect. '233 The AAIA currently requires "that every rea-
sonable step has been taken to minimize the adverse effect. "234
However, challenges brought under these federal statutes asking
courts to strictly enforce the statutory text to "minimize" envi-
ronmental impact are rare, and have been largely unsuccessful
to date.
235
230 Id. at * 17.
231 Id.
232 See, e.g., Berkeley KeepJets over the Bay Comm. v. Bd. of Port Comm'rs, 111
Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, 605-06 (Ct. App. 2001) (upholding an injunction of Oakland
airport terminal expansion under CEQA, under which "the agency may approve
the project only upon finding that it has '[e]liminated or substantially lessened
all significant effects on the environment where feasible"'); City of Des Moines v.
Puget Sound Reg'l Council, 988 P.2d 27, 34-35 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (imposing
substantive "permitting and mitigation requirements" on preliminary runway
construction activities at Seattle Tacoma airport, where Washington State Envi-
ronmental Policy Act is "similar" to the AAIA requirement to "minimize the ad-
verse effects" of airport expansion).
233 Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c) (4)
(1970).
234 Airport and Airway Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(B) (2006).
235 See, e.g., City of Normandy Park v. Port of Seattle, 165 F.3d 35 (9th Cir.
1998) (unpublished table decision) (rejecting municipal challenge that FAA
failed to determine under the AAIA that "'every reasonable step has been taken
to minimize the adverse effects"' of one new runway and extension of a second
runway at Seattle-Tacoma airport, despite the FAA's reliance "on a 'no growth'
demand model and a limited prediction forecast" to reach its conclusion "that
the air emissions levels would be 'de minimis"').
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III. JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSES
Consistent with the deferential review afforded agencies in en-
vironmental challenges to airport expansion, courts frequently
dismiss challenges for jurisdictional reasons.23 6 In particular,
with regard to challenges brought against the FAA in state court
or in a U.S. district court, the agency will argue that the review-
ing court does not have the authority to review its decision.2 " A
review of these cases is illustrative of the barriers that airport
expansion opponents must clear in order to have a legal chal-
lenge considered on its merits.
A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The balance between federal and state control with respect to
the environmental review of airport expansion has been de-
scribed as "a nightmare in federalism. ' 28 The federal-state bal-
ance prior to NEPA was addressed in 1969 by the Chancery
Division of the Superior Court of NewJersey in Township of Han-
over v. Town of Morristown, where the Town of Morristown sought
to expand an airport that it operated in the adjacent Township
of Hanover.23 9 Morristown planned to extend one of the air-
port's runways by 2,000 feet, but under Hanover's zoning ordi-
nance, airport use was not permitted 100 feet beyond the
existing runway. 240 Hanover sought a permanent injunction
against the runway extension or, alternatively, a declaration that
the planned extension would be a violation of its zoning ordi-
nance. 241  Morristown argued that the state court was without
authority to consider Hanover's challenge to the runway exten-
sion because the federal government had "fully pre-empted the
field and by such pre-emption has foreclosed states and state
courts from interfering in any way with federally regulated air
travel and airports. 242
236 See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
237 Mergen, supra note 40, at 22 (suggesting that having environmental chal-
lenges heard in the U.S. Courts of Appeals "works to the FAA's advantage" and is
one "factor likely contributing to the FAA's record" of success in such cases).
238 See Negaard v. Dep't of Aeronautics, 107 Cal. Rptr. 920, 922 (Ct. App.
1973).
239 Twp. of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 261 A.2d 692, 693-94 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1969); see supra notes 3-19 and accompanying text.
240 Twp. of Hanover, 261 A.2d at 698-99.
241 Id. at 693, 699.
242 Id. at 698-99.
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The state court acknowledged that the federal government
preempted certain aspects of aviation, "namely altitudes, flight
patterns, take-offs and landings," by establishing the FAA as an
"expert agency" in these areas.243 The FAA's primary responsibil-
ity was aviation safety, determined the court, "and insofar as
safety is the prime consideration as to aircraft operating proce-
dures, this Court cannot supersede the expertise of the
[FAA] ."244 The FAA's second highest priority was abatement of
noise, but at the time had not "created any definitive standards
for land use planning as it is related to aircraft noise. 2 45 There-
fore, the court reasoned, where a local zoning ordinance did
not conflict with FAA supremacy over aviation safety and where
the ordinance was "consistent with the avowed second purpose
of [the FAA], suppression of noise, a state court may act" with
respect to environmental challenges to airport expansion
brought under the local ordinance. 46
Determining, therefore, that it had jurisdiction, the court pro-
ceeded to deny injunctive relief, concluding that Hanover's spe-
cific zoning ordinance, which would effectively bar any
expansion of the airport, conflicted with the public interest in
air transportation.24 7 However, the court imposed substantive
mitigation requirements as well as enhanced operating proce-
dures for the expanded airport, effectively requiring the airport
to develop an evidentiary record for future environmental chal-
lenges in court.248 Thus, the state court indicated that it would
be willing to hear future claims related to adverse impacts of the
expanded airport, and it retained jurisdiction to take future ac-
tion to alleviate such problems.249
However, in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc. determined that, with passage of the
Noise Control Act of 1972, the federal government had pre-
empted state and local control over aircraft noise. 250 Under the
Noise Control Act, if the EPA concluded that a proposed course
of action by the FAA "does not protect the public health and
welfare from aircraft noise," it could challenge the FAA to pre-
24a Id. at 700.
244 Id. at 697.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 700.
247 Id. at 702.
248 Id. at 707-08; see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
249 Twp. of Hanover, 261 A.2d at 707.
250 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973).
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pare an EIS detailing "the environmental effects (including
those which cannot be avoided) of the action actually taken by
the FAA. ' '25 1 Four dissenting justices contended that the major-
ity opinion only prohibited states from attempting to regulate
aircraft noise, it did not prohibit states from exercising authority
over airport construction or expansion in accordance with state en-
vironmental concerns:
A local governing body could likewise use its traditional police
power to prevent the establishment of a new airport or the ex-
pansion of an existing one within its territorial jurisdiction by de-
clining to grant the necessary zoning for such a facility. Even
though the local government's decision[s] in each case were mo-
tivated entirely because of the noise associated with airports, I do
not read the Court's opinion as indicating that such action would
be prohibited by the Supremacy Clause merely because the Fed-
eral Government has undertaken the responsibility for some as-
pects of aircraft noise control.252
Nevertheless, subsequent state court decisions in the 1970s in-
terpreted the Burbank opinion to prohibit state courts and local
agencies from hindering airport expansion on environmental
grounds.z -
In 1980, however, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari
regarding a decision by the Supreme Court of California that
would permit state and local governments to limit airport ex-
pansion on the basis of environmental concerns.254 In Greater
Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, the state court
was persuaded by the fact that, although the FAA may have en-
251 Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, § 7(b), 86 Stat. 1234, 1240
(1972) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1431(c) (1976)); see City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at
631-32, 632 n.8.
252 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
253 See, e.g., Twp. of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 343 A.2d 792, 796 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (holding that "control and regulation of aircraft noise
has been preempted by the Federal Government and that the Chancery Division
infringed on the federal power when it imposed the restrictions on the use of the
airport" to mitigate the environmental impacts of airport expansion); Vill. of
Bensenville v. City of Chi., 306 N.E.2d 562, 563, 565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (declin-
ing state court jurisdiction over an environmental challenge to expansion of the
O'Hare airport because the federal government "has, through the Federal Avia-
tion Act, as now supplemented by the Noise Control Act . . . so occupied the
regulation of aircraft noise and air pollution as to preempt any state or local
action in that field").
254 City of L.A. v. Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
See generally Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of L.A., 603 P.2d 1329
(Cal. 1979).
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couraged expansion of the Los Angeles International Airport
(LAX), it was the City of Los Angeles, "and not the federal gov-
ernment, [that] decided to build and then to expand the air-
port in the immediate vicinity of a residential area. '"255 With
federal approval, the "[c]ity voluntarily elected to expand the
facility, with foreknowledge of the preexisting nature and usage
of the surrounding area," and was therefore barred from argu-
ing that, as an arm of the state government, it was federally pre-
empted from fulfilling its obligation "to minimize noise at
LAX. ' 256 While recognizing federal preemption of the airspace
and "aircraft in flight, ' 257 the court determined that the state
legislature could still impose on the airport the responsibility "to
institute reasonable noise abatement procedures which do not
conflict with federal law, ' 258 a responsibility that extends to air-
port facilities construction and "land use planning designed to
minimize the effects of noise. '259 This appeared to reverse ear-
lier interpretations of the Supreme Court's Burbank holding, in
that not only was it permissible for state and local governments to
limit airport expansion on the basis of environmental concerns,
it was their responsibility to do so, particularly where the state or
local government is the airport proprietor.2 a0
The California Court of Appeal relied on this understanding
in 1999 in City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Au-
thority to affirm that state and local governments have broad au-
thority over the approval of airport expansion, which is based on
their land regulation powers.2 6 1 Likewise, in 2002, the Appellate
Court of Illinois, in Philip v. Daley, held that an Illinois state stat-
ute requiring state approval prior to airport expansion was not
federally preempted 26 2: "In short, the way we do business in this
state is our business, and ours alone.."26  The scope of aviation
activity that the judiciary recognizes to be federally preempted-
namely, aircraft in flight-thus appears to be sufficiently limited
to provide state legislatures-and state courts-with broad au-
255 Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n, 603 P.2d at 1335.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1333.
258 Id. at 1337.
259 Id. at 1334.
260 See id.; supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
261 City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 85 Cal. Rptr.
2d 28, 36-37 (Ct. App. 1999).
262 Philip v. Daley, 790 N.E.2d 961, 972-74 (111. App. Ct. 2003), vacated sub nom.
Daley v. Hutchinson, No. 96780, 2003 WL 23610572 (Ill. Sept. 9, 2003).
263 Id. at 974.
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thority to limit airport expansion due to environmental
concerns.
264
B. ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
Where a challenge to airport expansion is brought in federal
court, the FAA will prefer for the challenge to be heard in the
U.S. courts of appeals, effectively treating the Agency's decision
as a trial court order entitled to deference.265 Opponents to air-
port expansion hope to have their concerns heard in U.S. dis-
trict court, assuming that the challenge will be more likely to
succeed if the reviewing court undertakes additional fact-finding
rather than merely adopting the record compiled by the FAA.266
However, because NEPA itself does not contain a jurisdictional
grant, the proper forum depends on the application of other
statutes.
In 1975, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois considered a NEPA challenge to a newly constructed
runway and taxiway at O'Hare International Airport for which
no EIS had been prepared.267 The court concluded, despite
FAA objections, that it had jurisdiction to consider NEPA com-
plaints. 268 The court rejected the FAA's contention that the mu-
nicipal plaintiffs were required to first exhaust their
administrative review options under the Federal Aviation 'Act,
criticizing the FAA's notice-and-comment regulations under
NEPA as "deficient. ' 269 Although the court found the adminis-
trative review section of the Federal Aviation Act inadequate,27 °
it did not appear to notice the judicial review section of the
same statute, which provided that final FAA orders "shall be sub-
ject to review by the courts of appeals of the United States. 271
264 SeeJohn J. Jenkins Jr., Comment, The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990:
Has Congress Finally Solved the Aircraft Noise Problem?, 59 J. AiR L. & CoM. 1023,
1029-30 (1994) ("The current trend regarding preemption of state and local
regulations appears to be toward acceptance of concurrent regulation, so long as
compliance with the local regulations does not make compliance with federal
regulations impossible.").
265 See Mergen, supra note 40, at 22 & n.6.
266 Id. at 22 ("District court judges are not necessarily immune from the con-
cerns of the communities they serve and may be more receptive to local objec-
tions to airport projects.").
267 Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Butterfield, 396 F. Supp. 632, 635-36 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
268 Id. at 636-39.
269 Id. at 638-39.
270 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 1482 (1970).
271 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a).
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Ten years later, however, the same court dismissed onjurisdic-
tional grounds a NEPA complaint related to the FAA's approval
of the O'Hare airport development plan, determining that "ex-
clusive jurisdiction vests in the Court of Appeals to review all
final orders of the FAA made under" the Federal Aviation Act.
272
The plaintiffs contended that the FAA approved the develop-
ment plan under the AAIA, not the Federal Aviation Act, and
that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction grant did not apply.273
The court determined that the authority to approve the airport
development plan was at least partly derived from the Federal
Aviation Act, suggesting jurisdiction was proper only in the
courts of appeals. 274 Furthermore, even if the order was issued
under AAIA authority, it did not necessarily follow "that if the
Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review an FAA order, the
district court necessarily has such jurisdiction: the order may
simply be unreviewable." 275 The following year, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the courts of ap-
peals had exclusive jurisdiction 276 and that the plaintiffs were
"effectively foreclosed from pursuing their claims in the district
court."
277
Although the Northern District of Illinois concluded that the
courts of appeals "uniformly held" that they had exclusive juris-
diction over FAA orders, even those partially authorized by the
AAIA, it acknowledged that "this issue is not simple" and that
courts struggled with "determining when ... [FAA] action [fell]
within the scope of [the] statute directing exclusive review in
the Court[s] of Appeals."278 A few years later, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio lamented the "absence
of instruction on this subject in this Circuit" regarding judicial
review of an FAA order.2 79 In that case, municipal plaintiffs
brought a NEPA challenge against the FAA's environmental re-
view of a proposed new runway at the Greater Cincinnati Inter-
272 Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 603 F. Supp. 1013, 1018, 1032 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
273 Id. at 1020.
274 Id. at 1021.
275 Id. at 1022.
276 Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1986) ("If
there is any ambiguity as to whether jurisdiction lies with a district court or with a
court of appeals we must resolve that ambiguity in favor of review by a court of
appeals.").
277 Id. at 193.
278 Suburban O'Hare Comm'n, 603 F. Supp. at 1017-18, 1023.
279 Twp. of Delhi v. McArtor, 696 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
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national Airport.2"' The FAA performed an EA for the new
runway and issued a FONSI, subsequently granting over $36 mil-
lion for the runway's construction. 28' The municipal plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction in the district court, contending
that the FONSI could not qualify as a final FAA order because it
failed to comply with NEPA requirements. 282 Notably, the plain-
tiffs acknowledged that they could not ultimately prevent con-
struction of the runway once the FAA performed a complete
environmental review, but only sought to enjoin preliminary
site-work until the FAA issued a "final order" that satisfied its
requirements under NEPA.2 3 However, due to the judicial def-
erence afforded to the consideration of environmental impacts
under NEPA, the court determined that the FONSI was a final
order of the FAA, so the only question was whether such a final
FAA order was subject to the exclusive review of the courts of
appeals. 284 Acknowledging the Seventh Circuit's holding in the
O'Hare litigation, the district court noted its "substantial doubts
regarding its subject matter jurisdiction, '"285 but nevertheless
proceeded to consider the matter on its merits and then deny
the injunction.286
In 2003, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rejected the notion that it had exclusive or original juris-
diction to review FAA orders approving airport development
plans.287 In 1994, the FAA approved an airport layout plan for
the East Hampton Airport (superseding a plan it had previously
approved in 1989) and proceeded to fund construction projects
under the 1994 plan.2 8 A plaintiff organization opposed to air-
port expansion brought a successful state court challenge, invali-
dating the process under which the 1994 plan was approved.28 9
As a result, at the town's request, in 2001 the FAA reverted to its
280 Id. at 1159-60.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 1160-61.
284 Id. at 1161.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 1161-63. The court appeared to be impressed with the thoroughness
of the EA, believing that it would largely satisfy the requirements of an EIS, which
the municipal plaintiffs felt was warranted. Id. at 1159 n.2 (noting that the EA
"consists of four volumes measuring 8" in height"); id. at 1161-62 (noting that
the EA included a thorough discussion of alternatives).
287 Comm. to Stop Airport Expansion v. FAA, 320 F.3d 285, 287, 291 (2d Cir.
2003).
288 Id. at 286.
289 Id.
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previously approved 1989 development plan for the airport.29 °
The same plaintiff organization challenged that action in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, contending that
re-approval of the 1989 plan was effectively the adoption of a
new development plan, requiring full NEPA review.291 The FAA
argued that exclusive jurisdiction resided in the courts of ap-
peals.292 However, the Second Circuit determined that it did
not have original jurisdiction over the challenge, because reap-
proval of the 1989 plan was an FAA action taken under its AAIA
authority over airport development and noise management, and
not an FAA order under the Federal Aviation Act.2 3 Since the
Seventh Circuit's 1985 holding in the O'Hare litigation, the ju-
dicial review section of the Federal Aviation Act had been modi-
fied to expressly indicate that review was available only in the
courts of appeals for challenges to FAA orders "with respect to
aviation safety duties and powers" in the "Air Commerce and
Safety" category.294 Additionally, a judicial review section had
been added to the AAIA granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
courts of appeals for review of FAA orders withholding approval of
expansion projects. 29 5 Therefore, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that Congress did not intend to grant exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the courts of appeals for challenges to FAA orders
approving development projects. 296
Decisions in other circuits over the ensuing months indicate
some confusion as to original and exclusive jurisdiction regard-
ing environmental challenges to FAA orders approving airport
development. In April 2003, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California asserted jurisdiction over a
FONSI issued by the FAA with respect to a runway extension at
Mammoth Lakes Airport, enjoining construction despite the
FAA's contention that its order related to air commerce and was
reviewable only in the courts of appeals. 29 7 However, in July
290 Id. at 286-87.
291 Id. at 287.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 287-88.
294 Id. at 289-90 (emphasis omitted); see 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2000).
295 Comm. to Stop Airport Expansion, 320 F.3d at 288; see 49 U.S.C. § 47106(d) (3).
296 Comm. to Stop Airport Expansion, 320 F.3d at 290-91.
297 California v. U.S. DOT, 260 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (cit-
ing City of Alameda v. FAA, 285 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002), which dictates
that "[t] he fact that the ROD refers to matters of Airport Safety and Commerce is
of no import here, since petitioners challenge [environmental] actions unrelated
to either of those matters").
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2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deter-
mined that it had original and exclusive jurisdiction over a
FONSI issued by the FAA with respect to a proposed new runway
at Piedmont-Triad International Airport as well as the FAA's
subsequent ROD approving the new airport development plan
because the ROD stated that the proposed new runway was "rea-
sonably necessary for use in air commerce," and thus fell under
the jurisdictional grant for air commerce and safety.2 98 In De-
cember 2003, Congress modified the jurisdictional grant in the
Federal Aviation Act to clarify that the courts of appeals had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over FAA orders arising under the FAA's "avi-
ation duties and powers" related to either air commerce, safety,
noise, or airport development.299 Recent decisions reflect a consen-
sus that the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over
challenges to FAA actions brought under NEPA.3 0° This consen-
sus, combined with the Vision 100 requirement that all state and
federal agencies participate in a "coordinated environmental re-
view process" under the direction of the FAA,3°' may have the
effect of federally preempting state court challenges to airport
expansion on environmental grounds, at least where the airport
expansion is federally funded. 2
298 Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, 69 F. App'x 617, 619-21 (4th Cir. 2003).
299 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a); see also St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of
Chi., 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 903 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 2005), affd, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.
2007).
300 See, e.g., Ass'n of Citizens to Protect and Pres. the Env't of the Oak Grove
Cmty. v. FAA, 287 F. App'x 764, 767 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming the
dismissal of challenge to FONSI, issued by the FAA for runway extension at Troy
Municipal Airport, on the grounds that the Middle District of Alabama did not
have subject matter jurisdiction).
301 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
302 Federal preemption of airport expansion may have been the intent of these
2003 legislative changes, as they were enacted amid an emerging consensus rec-
ognizing the need to "yield to more federal control" over the aviation industry
and airport expansion in particular. See Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, Phoenix
Grounded: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Changing Preemption Doctrine on State and
Local Impediments to Airport Expansion, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 941, 993 (2003) ("A
greater federal presence will lead to industry growth without artificial constraints,
will reduce the delays needlessly caused by inhibited airport expansion, and, by
placing accountability at the national level, will help reduce local strife over air-
port expansion.").
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IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
A. DATABASE DEVELOPMENT
Faced with the variety of environmental challenges brought in
court against airport expansion, including claims made under
the three NEPA prongs, the author undertook a comprehensive
review of all available judicial opinions on the subject. Each
known case was categorized according to the factual setting and
legal claims considered by the court, and a regression analysis
was then performed to identify what factors are statistically sig-
nificant in a court's decision to either approve the environmen-
tal review or to enjoin airport expansion.
One hundred forty judicial opinions were identified that in-
volved environmental challenges to the construction or physical
expansion of an airport. Environmental challenges to the con-
tinued operation of an existing airport or to revised airport pro-
cedures, not involving physical construction, are not considered
herein. Likewise, this study does not include challenges to air-
port expansion on takings grounds or challenges made purely
on the basis of local zoning ordinances designed to prohibit air-
port expansion, unless those opinions also deal with environ-
mental challenges such as failure to adequately consider
environmental impacts, alternatives, or mitigation measures.3
The reported opinions were categorized according to the fac-
tual setting of the case, the environmental claims considered
within the text of the opinion, and the outcome of the case.
With respect to the factual setting of each case, parameters con-
sidered include the degree of expansion contemplated, the
stage of development challenged, the level of environmental re-
view that was performed, the date of decision, and the court
hearing the case.
The degree of expansion being challenged is represented by
the parameter FExpand
, 
which is coded (on a scale of one to six, as
shown in Table 1) to generally reflect the impact of the planned
expansion on airport capacity (e.g., so that the value of FExpand
would be greater for a new airport than for a new terminal at an
existing airport). It was anticipated that judicial scrutiny of the
environmental review might correlate with the degree of expan-
303 Although zoning challenges to airport expansion are often motivated by
environmental concerns, adequacy of environmental review is a distinct issue and
generally is irrelevant to the question of whether zoning ordinances permit air-
port expansion. See generally Donald W. Tuegel, Note, Airport Expansions: The Need
for a Greater Federal Role, 54 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 291, 309-10 (1998).
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sion.3 0 4 Eighteen cases involve the proposed construction of a
new airport (FExpand = 6),305 including three cases involving chal-
lenges to Denver International Airport in the early 1990s,3 °6 and
three recent cases involving the new Panama City-Bay County
Airport.307 Fourteen cases involve the addition of two or more
runways to an existing airport (FExpand = 5),3°8 most of which are
304 See, e.g., Life of the Land v. Volpe, 363 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 n.9 (D. Haw.
1972), affd, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973) ("For example, an adequate EIS in
connection with the establishment of a new airport might well differ quantita-
tively and qualitatively from an adequate EIS in connection with the expansion of
an existing airport.").
305 Three of these eighteen challenges involving new airport construction (FEX.
pand = 6) took place when the proposed new airport was still in the speculative or
planning stages (Fstage = 1). See Karst Envtl. Educ. & Prot., Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d
1291, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Miami Sierra Club v. State Admin. Comm'n, 721 So.
2d 829, 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Univ. of Tenn. Arboretum Soc'y, Inc. v.
City of Oak Ridge, 1983 WL 825161, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 1983).
Four of these eighteen opinions involve challenges to site selection or land
acquisition for a new airport (Fsag, = 2). See Matsumoto v. Brinegar, 568 F.2d
1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 1978); Missouri ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v.
Coleman, 427 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Missouri ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v. Adams, 564 F.2d 600 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision); Negaard v. Dep't of Aeronautics, 107
Cal. Rptr. 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1973); Sutton v. Yates Cnty., 598 N.Y.S.2d 646, 647
(App. Div. 1993).
Five opinions involve challenges to preliminary site development (Fsag. = 3)
such as the filling of wetlands. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FAA, 564
F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2009); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
958 F.2d 659, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1992); Fla. Clean Water Network, Inc. v. Grossk-
ruger, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241 n.9 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Fla. Clean Water Net-
work, Inc. v. Grosskruger, No. 3:08-cv-120-J-32TEM, 2008 WL 435156, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 14, 2008); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No.
90-637-A, 1991 WL 398773, at *1 n.2 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 1991).
Four challenges were made when construction was imminent or ongoing (Fst'g
- 4). See Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Allison
v. DOT, 908 F.2d 1024, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Van Aire Skyport Corp. v. FAA, 733
F. Supp. 316, 318 (D. Colo. 1990); Citizens Airport Comm. of Chesterfield Cnty.
v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 52, 61 (E.D. Va. 1972).
Two of these eighteen opinions were issued after airport construction was com-
plete (Fsage = 5). See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. FAA, 18 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(unpublished table decision); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. FAA, 998 F.2d
1523, 1525 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993).
306 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 18 F.3d 953; Allison, 908 F.2d at 1026; Van Aire
Skyport Corp., 733 F. Supp. at 318.
3 7 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 564 F.3d at 551; Fla. Clean Water Network,
Inc., 587 F. Supp. 2d at 1238; Ha. Clean Water Network, Inc., 2008 WL 435156, at *1.
308 Five out of fourteen opinions involve challenges to new runways still in the
planning stages (Fsag, = 1), where construction was not imminent or was even
speculative. See City of Grapevine, Tex. v. DOT, 17 F.3d 1502, 1503, 1509 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); City of Taylor v. Bussey, No. 90-CV-71452-DT, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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directed at the expansion of O'Hare International Airport in
Chicago." °9 Thirty-six cases involve the addition of a single new
runway (Frxpand = 4) ;310 eight of these cases are challenges to run-
6865, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 1991); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 705
N.E.2d 48, 49 (Il. 1998); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 769 N.E.2d 84,
88-89 (I11. App. Ct. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, 779 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. 2002);
People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 686 N.E.2d 66, 68 (111. App. Ct. 1997), aft'd,
705 N.E. 2d 48 (11l. 1998).
Four of these fourteen opinions involve challenges to the acquisition of land
(Fsage = 2) for new runways at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport. See St.
John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 2007);
Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52, 57, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2006); St. John's United
Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2005), afj'd,
502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007); Philip v. Daley, 790 N.E.2d 961, 963 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003), vacated sub nom., Daley v. Hutchinson, 2003 WL 23610572 (Ill. Sept. 9,
2003).
Two cases deal with challenges to filling wetlands to prepare a site for runway
construction (Fsage = 3). See Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, No. 06-cv-2820, 2007 WL 495245, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2007); Alaska
Ctr. for the Env't v. State, 80 P.3d 231, 235 (Alaska 2003).
One opinion involves a challenge to final agency approval of the imminent
construction (Fstag e = 4) of two runways at Standiford Field in Kentucky. See
Cmtys., Inc. v. Busey, 956 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1992).
Two of the fourteen opinions involve litigation in the 2004-2007 timeframe
surrounding expansion of the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, where
the two new runways were completed in 1994 and 1996 (Fsag, = 5). See United
States ex rel. Heath v. Dall.-Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 260 F. App'x 708, 709
(5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Heath v. Dall./Fort Worth Int'l
Airport Bd., No. 3:99-CV-0100-M, 2004 WL 1197483, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 28,
2004).
309 St. John's United Church of Christ, 502 F.3d at 619; Vill. of Bensenville, 457 F.3d
at 57; Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n, 2007 WL 495245, at *1; St. John's United
Church of Christ, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 890; People ex rel. Birkett, 705 N.E.2d at 49;
Philip, 790 N.E.2d at 963; People ex rel. Birkett, 769 N.E.2d at 88; People ex rel. Birkett,
686 N.E.2d at 67.
310 Two of these opinions involve challenges to more preliminary plans where
the new runway was speculative (Fsuag, = 1). See City of Normandy Park v. Port of
Seattle, 165 F.3d 35 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); Airport Impact
Relief, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., No. 941371B, 1995 WL 809553, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 8, 1995).
One opinion involves a challenge to acquisition of land (Fstag. = 2) for construc-
tion of the new runway. See Town of Fairview, Tex. v. U.S. DOT, 201 F. Supp. 2d
64, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2002).
Ten of the thirty-six opinions involve challenges to preparation of the site for
runway construction (Fsage = 3), such as excavation, grading, dredging, filling, or
demolition of pre-existing structures on the site of the proposed runway. See City
of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. EPA, 435 F.3d 632, 633 (6th Cir. 2006); Alliance for
Legal Action v. FAA, 69 F. App'x 617, 619 (4th Cir. 2003); Families for Asbestos
Compliance Testing & Safety v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 638 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1118
(E.D. Mo. 2009); Families for Asbestos Compliance Testing & Safety v. City of St.
Louis, Mo., No. 4:05-CV-719 (CEJ), 2008 WL 4279569, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 15,
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way construction at Logan International Airport in Boston. 1'
Some of these cases also involve other improvements, such as
the extension of an existing runway in addition to the new run-
way. 12 Where a case involves multiple improvements, for the
purposes of this regression analysis, it is coded according to the
expansion activity that contributes the most to expanding the
capacity of the airport (i.e., the largest value of FExpand). Forty-six
cases are challenges to runway extensions (FExpand = 3), which is
2008); Alliance for Legal Action v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 314 F. Supp. 2d
534, 537 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Airport Cmtys. Coal. v. Graves, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1207,
1211 (W.D. Wash. 2003); Twp. of Delhi v. McArtor, 696 F. Supp. 1157, 1159 (S.D.
Ohio 1988); McCain v. Cnty. of Lassen, Nos. C036601, C038265, 2003 WL
123065, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings
Bd., 90 P.3d 659, 665 (Wash. 2004); City of Des Moines v. Puget Sound Reg'l
Council, 988 P.2d 27, 33-34 (Wash Ct. App. 1999).
In eighteen challenges, runway construction is presumed to be ongoing or im-
minent (Fsage = 4). See Heide v. FAA, 110 F. App'x 724, 725 (8th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam); Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 2004); City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2000); Sutton v.
U.S. DOT, 38 F.3d 621, 622 (2d Cir. 1994); Cottonwood Grove Dev. Corp. v. FAA,
952 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision); City of Bos. v. Brine-
gar, 512 F.2d 319, 320 (1st Cir. 1975); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460,
462-63 (9th Cir. 1973); Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 303 v. City of W.
Chi., 701 F. Supp. 662, 633 (N.D. Ill. 1988); City of Atlanta v. United States, 531 F.
Supp. 506, 507 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Steele Creek Cmty. Ass'n v. U.S. DOT, 435 F.
Supp. 196, 197 (W.D.N.C. 1977); City of Romulus v. Cnty. of Wayne, 392 F. Supp.
578, 583 (E.D. Mich. 1975), vacated, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980); Life of the
Land v. Volpe, 363 F. Supp. 1171, 1172 (D. Haw. 1972); Town of Hull v. Mass.
Port Auth., 806 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Mass. 2004); Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs v. Mass. Port
Auth., 323 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 1975); Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No.
012731BLS2, 2004 WL 1588263, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 26, 2004); Mass. Port
Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 0102731BLS2, 2003 WL 23163109, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Nov. 18, 2003); Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 012731BLS2, 2003 WL
23163113, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003); Gleason v. Metro. Airports
Comm'n, No. C3-00-31, 2000 WL 821676, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27, 2000).
Five of these thirty-six challenges sought to enjoin the use of a runway after
construction was completed (Fsge = 5). See City of Romulus v. Cnty. of Wayne,
634 F.2d 347, 348 (6th Cir. 1980); City of Blue Ash, Ohio v. McLucas, 596 F.2d
709, 710-11 (6th Cir. 1979); City of Southlake v. FAA, 679 F. Supp. 618, 619
(N.D. Tex. 1986); Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Butterfield, 396 F. Supp. 632, 634 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); N.O.I.S.E., Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 89-175-I1, 1989
WL 155923, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1989).
31 Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc., 355 F.3d at 681; Brinegar, 512 F.2d at
320; 7own of Hull, 806 N.E.2d at 903; Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs, 323 N.E.2d at 331;
Mass. Port Auth., 2004 WL 1588263, at *1; Mass. Port Auth., 2003 WL 23163109, at
*1; Mass. Port Auth., 2003 WL 23163113, at *1; Airport Impact Relief Inc., 1995 WL
809553, at *1.
312 See, e.g., Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc., 355 F.3d at 681; Steel Creek
Cmty. Ass'n, 435 F. supp. at 507; Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs, 323 N.E.2d at 331.
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the most common challenge.313 Four cases involve expansion of
313 Four of these cases involve challenges in the planning stage, where runway
extension was still conceptual or speculative (Fsg = 1). See Nat'l Parks & Conser-
vation Ass'n v. U.S. DOT, 222 F.3d 677, 679 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000); Friends of Mam-
moth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redev. Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 340-41
(Ct. App. 2000); City of Lomita v. City of Torrance, 196 Cal. Rptr. 538, 540 (Ct.
App. 1983); Georgetown Crime Prevention v. King Cnty., No. 45681-4-1, 103
Wash. App. 1039, at *1 (Ct. App. 2000).
Eight of these forty-six opinions deal with challenges to the acquisition of land
(Fsage = 2) to accommodate the runway extension. SeeAss'n of Citizens to Protect
& Pres. the Env't of the Oak Grove Cmty. v. FAA, 287 F. App'x 764, 765 (11th Cir.
2008) (per curiam); Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA, 292 F.3d 251, 252 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Citizens Comm. for the Columbia River v. Callaway, 494 F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir.
1974); Ass'n of Citizens to Protect & Pres. the Env't of the Oak Grove Cmty. v.
FAA, No. 2:07-cv-378-MEF, 2007 WL 3205974, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 31, 2007),
affd, 287 Fed. App'x 764 (11 th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Town of New Windsor v.
Ronan, 329 F. Supp. 1286, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bakman v. Cal. DOT, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 583, 586 (Ct. App. 1979); Cnty. of Orange v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 337
N.Y.S.2d 178, 183 (Sup. Ct. 1971), affd, 332 N.Y.S.2d 420 (App. Div. 1972).
Fifteen of the forty-six opinions involve challenges to preparation of the run-
way extension site (Fsag - 3), such as grading, dredging, filling of wetlands, creek
realignment, or environmental cleanup of the site. See City of Olmsted Falls,
Ohio v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 266, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2002); City of Olmsted Falls v.
EPA, 266 F. Supp. 2d 718, 719 (N.D. Ohio 2003), affd, 435 F.3d 632 (6th Cir.
2006); California v. U.S. DOT, Nos. C02-4621 BZ, C02-4623 BZ, 2003 WL
21058179, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2003); City of Olmsted Falls v. EPA, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 890, 892 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Miron v. Menominee Cnty., 795 F. Supp.
840, 841 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Petterson v. Froehlke, 354 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D. Or.
1972); Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302, 1303 (D. Or. 1971); Santa Barbara
Channelkeeper v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. B178125, 2005 WL 2660048, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2005); City of Goleta v. Cal. Coast Comm'n, No.
CIV214036, 2004 WL 5371311, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 2004); Criscuolo v.
Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. CV074014323S, 2008 WL 4635847, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008); Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Orleans Levee Bd., 368 So. 2d
1210, 1211-12, 1214 (La. Ct. App. 1979); City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. Jones,
787 N.E.2d 669, 670 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590
P.2d 709, 710 (Or. 1979) (en banc); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d
520, 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979); Morse v. Div. of State
Lands, 572 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
In fourteen challenges, runway construction is presumed to be ongoing or im-
minent (Fs~g, = 4). See West v. FAA, 320 F. App'x 782, 783 (9th Cir. 2009); City of
Oxford, Ga. v. FAA, 428 F.3d 1346, 1348 (l1th Cir. 2005); Citizens Against Bur-
lington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1991); C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v.
FAA, 844 F.2d 1569, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988); Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole,
787 F.2d 186, 187 (7th Cir. 1986); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d
322, 322 (9th Cir. 1975); Town of New Windsor v. Ronan, 481 F.2d 450, 452 (2d
Cir. 1973); Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 561 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2008); California v. U.S. DOT, 260 F. Supp. 2d
969, 971 (N.D. Cal. 2003); City of Tempe, Ariz. v. FAA, 239 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56
(D.D.C. 2003); Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 603 F. Supp. 1013, 1014-15
(N.D. Ill. 1985); Citizens for Responsible Area Growth (CRAG) v. Adams, 477 F.
782 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [76
the trafficable layout not involving runways, such as new taxiways
or new parking aprons (FExpand = 2) .314 Twenty-two cases involve
expansion of support facilities (such as a new terminal or han-
gar), not involving changes to the trafficable layout (FExpand =1).315
Supp. 994, 997 (D.N.H. 1979); Sierra Club v. Town of Mammoth Lakes, No.
C044984, 2005 WL 1492006, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2005); S.F. Ecology Ctr.
v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 122 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (Ct. App. 1975).
Five of these forty-six challenges sought to enjoin the use of a runway after
construction was completed (Fsuge = 5). See Comm. to Stop Airport Expansion v.
FAA, 320 F.3d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 2003); Citizen Advocacy Ctr. v. DuPage Airport
Auth., 141 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 1998); Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc. v.
United States, 90 F.3d 426, 428 (10th Cir. 1996); Twp. of Hanover v. Town of
Morristown, 343 A.2d 792, 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Gorman v. Town
Bd. of Town of E. Hampton, 709 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (App. Div. 2000).
314 One of these four opinions deals with a challenge to the acquisition of land
(Fsage = 2) for taxiway construction. See Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport
Auth. v. Hensler, 284 Cal. Rptr. 498, 500 (Ct. App. 1991).
In the other three challenges, site preparation activities were complete, and
construction of the taxiway or parking apron was imminent or ongoing (Fsage =
4). See Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Notably, peti-
tioners do not seek an injunction to stop the construction which has begun at
Logan."); City of Bos. v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 257 (1st Cir. 1972) (" [P] reparatory
work has gone forward and, in April 1972, construction began."); Comm. to Stop
Airport Expansion v. Town Bd. of Town of E. Hampton, 769 N.Y.S.2d 400, 400
(App. Div. 2003).
315 Three of these twenty-two opinions involve challenges to preliminary plans,
where the proposed airport expansion was conceptual or speculative (Fs,~g = 1).
See Town of Rye, N.Y. v. Skinner, 907 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
("[F]unding for the Airport project is uncertain."); Cnty. of Orange v. Air Cal.,
799 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir. 1986) (involving a plan "for the future development"
of the airport); City of Bos. v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698, 699 (D. Mass. 1975)
("[P]rojects ... may be built at some indeterminate time in the future, if at all.").
Four of these opinions deal with challenges to the acquisition or lease of land
for the expanded airport facilities (Fs,,g, = 2). See City of L.A. v. FAA, 138 F.3d
806, 807 (9th Cir. 1998); Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 680
F.2d 835, 836-37 (1st Cir. 1982); City of L.A. v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 547, 550
(D.D.C. 1975); City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 85
Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 30-31 (Ct. App. 1999).
One case involves a challenge to the filling of wetlands to prepare a site for the
new airport facilities (Fsag. = 3). See California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Marsh, 687
F. Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
In the remaining thirteen cases, it is presumed that construction is imminent
or ongoing (Fsag, = 4). See City of Alameda v. FAA, 285 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir.
2002); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1975);
Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Env't, Inc. v. Engen, 665 F. Supp. 537,
538 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), vacated sub nom., Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound
Env't, Inc. v. McArtor, 878 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1989); Long Beach Council of Par-
ents & Teachers, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, No. G040430, 2009 WL 1497505, at
*1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2009); Fat v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d
402, 404-06 (Ct. App. 2002); Berkeley Keep Jets over the Bay Comm. v. Bd. of
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Table 1. Coding scheme to represent degree of airport
expansion (Fapand) being challenged in a case.
Degree of Planned Airport Expansion Fapad Value
New Airport 6
Multiple New Runways 5
One New Runway 4
Runway Extension (s) 3
Other Trafficable Expansion (e.g., New Taxiway) 2
Expansion of Support Facilities 1
Each case is also categorized according to the stage of devel-
opment being challenged. This parameter, Fstage, is coded (on a
scale of one to five, as shown in Table 2) to reflect the immi-
nence of the expected environmental impact of the planned air-
port expansion. Unless otherwise stated in the opinion, it is
presumed that plaintiffs seek to enjoin imminent or ongoing
construction (Fstage = 4). This is, therefore, the most frequent
category, and fifty-three cases are coded to this value.3" 6 How-
ever, many challenges are made earlier in time. Thirty-three
cases seek to enjoin preliminary site-work (Fstage = 3) such as
dredging, filling, excavating, grading, or environmental cleanup
prior to construction.3 17 Twenty-two cases involve challenges to
acquisition of the site for the planned expansion (Fstage = 2). 3 18
Seventeen cases involve challenges to long-term development
plans, where construction is not imminent and may even be
speculative (Fstage = 1).219 Fifteen of the opinions involve chal-
lenges made after the airport has expanded, where construction
Port Comm'rs, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, 602 (Ct. App. 2001); People ex rel. Birkett v.
City of Chi., 779 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ill. 2002); City of Bos. v. Mass. Port Auth., 308
N.E.2d 488, 490-91 (Mass. 1974); Town of Babylon v. N.Y. State DOT, 849
N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (App. Div. 2008); Town of Babylon v. N.Y. State DOT, 822
N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (App. Div. 2006); Price v. Cnty. of Westchester, 650 N.Y.S.2d
839, 840 (App. Div. 1996); Stewart Park & Reserve Coal. v. N.Y. State DOT, 555
N.Y.S.2d 481, 483 (App. Div. 1990), afrd, 575 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1991); Town of
Babylon v. N.Y. State DOT, No. 15248-06, 2006 WL 6102985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept.
7, 2006) (trial order), affd, 849 NN.S.2d 611 (App. Div. 2006). One of these
twenty-two opinions involves a challenge after the new terminal was "completed
and operational" (Fs,,g = 5). See Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Env't,
Inc. v. McArtor, 878 F.2d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1989).
316 See sources cited supra notes 305, 308, 310, 313-15.
317 See sources cited supra notes 305, 308, 310, 313, 315.
318 See sources cited supra notes 305, 308, 310, 313-15.
319 See sources cited supra notes 305, 308, 310, 313, 315.
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is complete and plaintiffs seek to enjoin operation of the ex-
panded portion of the airport (Fsage = 5).32°
Table 2. Coding scheme to represent stage of development
(Fsa) that the expansion opponent is challenging.






Each case is also categorized according to the degree of envi-
ronmental review that has been conducted (on a scale of zero to
four, as shown in Table 3). This factor, FReiew, is one measure of
the compliance of the airport proprietor or defendant agency
with respect to NEPA or other similar procedural statutes. In
sixty-seven of the cases, a final EIS or EIR was prepared, and the
agency subsequently issued an ROD or equivalent order approv-
ing the expansion on that basis (FRview = 3).321 In four cases, the
320 See sources cited supra notes 305, 308, 313, 315.
321 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FAA, 564 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2009);
Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008); United States ex rel.
Heath v. Dall.-Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 260 F. App'x 708, 709 (5th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam); St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 623
(7th Cir. 2007); Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2006); City
of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. EPA, 435 F.3d 632, 634 (6th Cir. 2006); Cmtys. Against
Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Alliance for
Legal Action v. FAA, 69 F. App'x 617, 620 (4th Cir. 2003); City of Olmsted Falls,
Ohio v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Town of Stratford, Conn. v.
FAA, 292 F.3d 251, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA, 285
F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. U.S. DOT, 222
F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 2000) (FletcherJ. dissenting); City of Bridgeton v. Slater,
212 F.3d 448, 453-54 (8th Cir. 2000); City of L.A. v. FAA, 138 F.3d 806, 807 (9th
Cir. 1998); City of Grapevine, Tex. v. DOT, 17 F.3d 1502, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. FAA, 18 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (unpublished table
decision); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. FAA, 998 F.2d 1523, 1526 (10th
Cir. 1993); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 958 F.2d 659, 660
(5th Cir. 1992); Cmtys., Inc. v. Busey, 956 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1992); Cotton-
wood Grove Dev. Corp. v. FAA, 952 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table
decision); Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Allison v. DOT, 908 F.2d 1024, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Cnty. of Orange v.
Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir. 1986); Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole,
787 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1986); City of Blue Ash, Ohio v. McLucas, 596 F.2d
709, 711 (6th Cir. 1979); Matsumoto v. Brinegar, 568 F.2d 1289, 1290 (9th Cir.
1978); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d at 326; City of Bos. v.
Brinegar, 512 F.2d 319, 320 (1st Cir. 1975); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d
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460, 466 (9th Cir. 1973); Fla. Clean Water Network, Inc. v. Grosskruger, 587 F.
Supp. 2d 1236, 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Fla. Clean Water Network, Inc. v. Grossk-
ruger, No. 3:08-cv-120-J-32TEM, 2008 WL 435156, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2008);
Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 06-cv-2820, 2007
WL 495245, at *5 (N.D. 111. Feb. 14, 2007); St. John's United Church of Christ v.
City of Chi., 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2005), affd, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.
2007); United States ex rel. Heath v. Dall./Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., No.
3:99-CV-0100-M, 2004 WL 1197483, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2004); Alliance
for Legal Action v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 314 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538-39
(M.D.N.C. 2004); Airport Cmtys. Coal. v. Graves, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1218 n.11
(W.D. Wash. 2003); City of Olmsted Falls v. EPA, 266 F. Supp. 2d 718, 720 (N.D.
Ohio 2003), affd, 435 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2006); City of Olmsted Falls v. EPA, 233
F. Supp. 2d 890, 899 (N.D. Ohio 2002); City of Taylor v. Bussey, No. 90-CV-71452-
DT, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6865, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 1991); Van Aire Sky-
port Corp. v. FAA, 733 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Colo. 1990); City of Southlake v.
FAA, 679 F. Supp. 618, 619 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole,
603 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (N.D. I11. 1985); Steele Creek Cmty. Ass'n v. U.S. DOT,
435 F. Supp. 196, 200 (W.D.N.C. 1977), affd, 570 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1978) (un-
published table decision); Missouri ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v.
Coleman, 427 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom.,
Missouri ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v. Adams, 564 F.2d 600 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision); City of Romulus v. Cnty. of Wayne, 392
F. Supp. 578, 585 (E.D. Mich. 1975), vacated, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980); Life of
the Land v. Volpe, 363 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 (D. Haw. 1972), affd, 485 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1973); Citizens Airport Comm. of Chesterfield Cnty. v. Volpe, 351 F.
Supp. 52, 56 (E.D. Va. 1972); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. State, 80 P.3d 231, 236
(Alaska 2003); Long Beach Council of Parents & Teachers, Inc. v. City of Long
Beach, No. G040430, 2009 WL 1497505, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2009); Santa
Barbara Channelkeeper v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. B178125, 2005 WL
2660048, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2005); Berkeley Keep Jets over the Bay
Comm. v. Bd. of Port Comm'rs, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, 602 (Ct. App. 2001);
Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redev. Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr.
2d 334, 339 (Ct. App. 2000); City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Air-
port Auth., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1999); City of Lomita v. City of
Torrance, 196 Cal. Rptr. 538, 540 (Ct. App. 1983); S.F. Ecology Ctr. v. City &
Cmty. of S.F., 122 Cal. Rptr. 100, 105 (Ct. App. 1975); City of Goleta v. Cal. Coast
Comm'n, No. CIV214036, 2004 WL 5371311 (Cal. Super. Ct.June 17, 2004) (trial
order); Criscuolo v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. CV074014323S, 2008 WL
4635847, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008); Miami Sierra Club v. State Ad-
min. Comm'n, 721 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Town of Hull v.
Mass. Port Auth., 806 N.E.2d 901, 904 n.9 (Mass. 2004); Mass. Port Auth. v. City
of Bos., No. 012731BLS2, 2004 WL 1588263, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 26,
2004); Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 0102731BLS2, 2003 WL 23163109, at
*6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003); Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No.
012731BLS2, 2003 WL 23163113, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003); Airport
Impact Relief, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., No. 941371B, 1995 WL 809553, at *2
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 8, 1995); Gleason v. Metro. Airports Comm'n, No. C3-00-
31, 2000 WL 821676, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27, 2000); City of Olmsted Falls,
Ohio v. Jones, 787 N.E.2d 669, 673 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); N.O.I.S.E., Inc. v.
Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 89-175-I1, 1989 WL 155923, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 29, 1989); Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 90 P.3d
659, 667 n.4 (Wash. 2004). But see Berger, supra note 204, at 316 (concluding
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agency prepared a supplemental EIS (FRviw = 4) . 32 In nine
cases, the agency prepared a draft EIS, but the final EIS had not
yet been issued (FReiew-- 2) .121 In twenty-nine cases, the agency
performed an EA and issued a FONSI or equivalent negative
declaration, indicating that it does not plan to prepare an EIS
(FReview = 1). 3 24 In the remaining thirty-one cases, there is no in-
that RODs for airport expansion projects are less likely to be challenged than
FONSIs).
322 City of Normandy Park v. Port of Seattle, 165 F.3d 35 (9th Cir. 1998) (un-
published table decision); City of Romulus v. Cnty. of Wayne, 634 F.2d 347, 348
(6th Cir. 1980); Sierra Club v. Town of Mammoth Lakes, No. C044984, 2005 WL
1492006, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2005); City of Des Moines v. Puget Sound
Reg'l Council, 988 P.2d 27, 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
323 Citizens Comm. for the Columbia River v. Callaway, 494 F.2d 124, 125 (9th
Cir. 1974); Town of New Windsor v. Ronan, 481 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1973);
City of Bos. v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 257 (1st Cir. 1972); City of L.A. v. Coleman,
397 F. Supp. 547, 556 (D.D.C. 1975); Petterson v. Froehlke, 354 F. Supp. 45, 48
(D. Or. 1972), vacated sub nom., Citizens Comm. for the Columbia River, 494 F.2d 124;
Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302, 1303 (D. Or. 1971); Bakman v. Cal. DOT,
160 Cal. Rptr. 583, 587 (Ct. App. 1979); Cnty. of Orange v. Metro. Transp. Auth.,
337 N.Y.S.2d 178, 191 (Super. Ct. 1971), affd, 332 N.Y.S.2d 420 (App. Div. 1972);
Georgetown Crime Prevention v. King Cnty., No. 45681-4-1, 2000 WL 1772517, at
*3 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2000).
324 West v. FAA, 320 F. App'x 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2009); Ass'n of Citizens to
Protect & Pres. the Env't of the Oak Grove Cmty. v. FAA, 287 F. App'x 764, 765
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); City of Oxford, Ga. v. FAA, 428 F.3d 1346, 1351
(11th Cir. 2005); Heide v. FAA, 110 F. App'x 724, 725 (8th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam); Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2002); City of
Alameda v. FAA, 285 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002); Airport Neighbors Alliance,
Inc. v. United States, 90 F.3d 426, 427 (10th Cir. 1996); Sutton v. U.S. DOT, 38
F.3d 621, 623 (2d Cir. 1994); Town of Rye, N.Y. v. Skinner, 907 F.2d 23, 24 (2d
Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Env't, Inc. v.
McArtor, 878 F.2d 174, 177 (6th Cir. 1989); C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. FAA, 844 F.2d
1569, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988); Ass'n of Citizens to Protect & Pres. the Env't of the
Oak Grove Cmty. v. FAA, No. 2:07-cv-378-MEF, 2007 WL 3205974, at *1 n.1 (M.D.
Ala. Oct. 31, 2007), aff'd, 287 F. App'x 764 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Califor-
nia v. U.S. DOT, 260 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971 (N.D. Cal. 2003); California v. U.S.
DOT, Nos. C02-4621 BZ, C02-4623 BZ, 2003 WL 21058179, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
28, 2003); City of Tempe, Ariz. v. FAA, 239 F. Supp. 2d 55, 63 n.10 (D.D.C. 2003);
Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 303 v. City of W. Chi., 701 F. Supp. 662, 664
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Twp. of Delhi v. McArtor, 696 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (S.D. Ohio
1988); California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Marsh, 687 F. Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. Cal.
1988); Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Env't, Inc. v. Engen, 665 F. Supp.
537, 541 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), vacated sub nom., McArtor, 878 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.
1989); Citizens for Responsible Area Growth (CRAG) v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994,
997, 1003 (D.N.H. 1979); Fat v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402, 404
(Ct. App. 2002); Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs v. Mass. Port Auth., 323 N.E.2d 329, 338
(Mass. 1975); City of Bos. v. Mass. Port Auth., 308 N.E.2d 488, 501 (Mass. 1974);
Town of Babylon v. N.Y. State DOT, 849 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (App. Div. 2008);
Town of Babylon v. N.Y. State DOT, 822 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (App. Div. 2006); Price
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dication in the opinion that any formal environmental review
has been undertaken (FReiew = 0).
Table 3. Coding scheme to reflect level of environmental
review (FReiew) that has been conducted in a case.
Level of Enviromnental Review Fe,,iew Value
Supplemental EIS 4
Final EIS + ROD 3
Draft EIS 2
EA + FONSI 1
None 0
Two other factors considered in the regression analysis are
the court issuing the opinion and the date of decision:
* Fcourt: Fifty of the opinions were issued by a state court (Fcourt
= 1), forty of the cases were in a U.S. district court (Fcourt =
2), and fifty of the cases were decided by a U.S. court of
appeals (Fcout = 3)35
* FDate: This parameter is computed according to the follow-
ing formula:
FDa, = 1 (Year- 1970)
10
Thirty-two of the opinions date back to the 1970s (FDate < 1),
sixteen of the opinions are from the 1980s (1 < FDate < 2), twenty-
eight of the opinions are from the 1990s (2 < FDate < 3), and
sixty-four of the opinions are dated 2000 or later (FDat > 3).326
The opinions are also categorized according to the plaintiffs
claim with respect to the three primary NEPA prongs: analysis of
environmental impacts, consideration of alternatives, and dis-
cussion of mitigation measures. For the purposes of this study,
the cases are characterized only according to the specific claims
that are directly addressed or otherwise acknowledged in the
court's opinion, and not to any spurious claims that may have
v. Cnty. of Westchester, 650 N.Y.S.2d 839, 841 (App. Div. 1996); Sutton v. Yates
Cnty., 598 N.Y.S.2d 646, 647 (App. Div. 1993); Stewart Park & Reserve Coal. v.
N.Y. State DOT, 555 N.Y.S.2d 481, 481 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 575 N.E.2d 391
(N.Y. 1991); Town of Babylon v. N.Y. State DOT, No. 15248-06, 2006 WL 6102985
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 7, 2006) (trial order), affd, 849 N.Y.S.2d 611 (App. Div.
2008). But see Berger, supra note 204, at 296 ("The bulk of NEPA-related airport
expansion cases concern the preparation of EAs and FONSIs.").
325 See sources cited supra notes 305, 308, 310, 313-15.
326 See sources cited supra notes 305, 308, 310, 313-15.
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been made in the plaintiffs complaint or briefs. These factors
are coded (on scales of zero to two) as follows:
* Cimpact: Most of the opinions (ninety-two out of 140) address
a claim that the agency inadequately considered environ-
mental impacts. Forty-six (exactly one-half) of the ninety-
two cases address a challenge only to the consideration of
the direct impact of the planned expansion (CImpact = 1),
such as a claim that the agency's methodology was flawed or
that the agency failed to address environmental concerns
advanced by the public.127 In five cases, the opinion addi-
327 See Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008); Cmtys. Against
Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2004); City of Ala-
meda, 285 F.3d at 1145 n.3; City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448, 459 (8th Cir.
2000); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. U.S. DOT, 222 F.3d 677, 678-79 (9th
Cir. 2000); City of L.A. v. FAA, 138 F.3d 806, 807 (9th Cir. 1998); Citizen Advo-
cacy Ctr. v. DuPage Airport Auth., 141 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 1998); Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs v. FAA, 18 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished table
decision); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. FAA, 998 F.2d 1523, 1526 (10th
Cir. 1993); Cottonwood Grove Dev. Corp. v. FAA, 952 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished table decision); Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d
190, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 197
(7th Cir. 1986); City of Romulus, 634 F.2d at 348; Matsumoto v. Brinegar, 568 F.2d
1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 1978); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 469 (9th
Cir. 1973); Town of New Windsor, 481 F.2d at 455; Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 06-cv-2820, 2007 WL 495245, at *11 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 14, 2007); United States ex rel. Heath v. Dall./Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd.,
No. Civ.A.3:99-CV-0100-M, 2004 WL 1197483, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2004);
City of Tempe, Ariz., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 58; Miron v. Menominee Cnty., 795 F.
Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Mich. 1992); City of Taylor v. Bussey, No. 90-CV-71452-
DT, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6865, at *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 1991); Van Aire
Skyport Corp. v. FAA, 733 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D. Colo. 1990); Bd. of Educ., 701 F.
Supp. at 663; City of Southlake v. FAA, 679 F. Supp. 618, 619 (N.D. Tex. 1986);
City of Atlanta v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 506, 508 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Missouri
ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v. Coleman, 427 F. Supp. 1252, 1262
(D.D.C. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom., Missouri ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro.
Airport Auth. v. Adams, 504 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1977); City of L.A., 397 F. Supp. at
556-57; City of Romulus v. Cnty. of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 584 (E.D. Mich.
1975), vacated, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980); Frochlke, 354 F. Supp. at 49; Citizens
Airport Comm. of Chesterfield Cnty. v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 52, 58 (E.D. Va.
1972); McCain v. Cnty. of Lassen, Nos. C036601, C038265, 2003 WL 123065, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003); Fat, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403; Bakman, 160 Cal. Rptr.
588; Negaard v. Dep't of Aeronautics, 107 Cal. Rptr. 920, 923 (Ct. App. 1973);
Miami Sierra Club v. State Admin. Comm'n, 721 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998); Philip v. Daley, 790 N.E.2d 961, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), vacated sub
nom., Daley v. Hutchinson, 2003 WL 23610572 (Sept. 9, 2003); Town of Hull v.
Mass. Port Auth., 806 N.E.2d 901, 910 (Mass. 2004); Sec'y of Envil. Affairs, 323
N.E.2d at 342; City of Bos., 308 N.E.2d at 502; Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No.
0102731BLS2, 2003 WL 23163109, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003); Mass.
Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 012731BLS2, 2003 WL 23163113, at *9 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003); Gleason v. Metro. Airports Comm'n, No. C3-00-31,
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tionally addresses a challenge to the consideration of indi-
rect or secondary impacts of the planned expansion (Clmpact
= 1.5), such as the environmental impact due to growth that
is expected to be induced by the expanded airport. 28 In
forty-one of the ninety-two cases, the court addresses a
claim that the agency improperly segmented its analysis or
inadequately considered cumulative impacts (C.mpact = 2).9
2000 WL 821676, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27, 2000); Price, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 840;
N.O.I.S.E., Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, C.A. No. 89-175-I, 1989 WL
155923, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1989); Georgetown Crime Prevention, 2000
WL 1772517, at *1; City of Des Moines, 988 P.2d at 30, 34.
328 See Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, 69 F. App'x 617, 624 (4th Cir. 2003)
(Plaintiff "says the EIS should have included.., the effect of population growth
induced by the expansion."); City of Normandy Park v. Port of Seattle, 165 F.3d
35, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (Plaintiff claims that the
FAA "improperly relied on a 'no growth' demand model and a limited prediction
forecast thereby failing to accurately assess the project's environmental im-
pacts."); Life of the Land v. Volpe, 363 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (D. Haw. 1972), afj'd,
485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Plaintiffs question the omission from the EIS of
any discussion of the demographic impact of the traffic facilitated by the run-
way."); City of Lomita v. City of Torrance, 196 Cal. Rptr. 538, 543 (Ct. App. 1983)
(Plaintiffs claim "the EIR ignored the growth-inducing impact of the project.");
S.F. Ecology Ctr. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 122 Cal. Rptr. 100, 107 (Ct. App. 1975)
(Appellants raise "objections relating to ... traffic problems, growth-inducing
impact and tax burdens on San Francisco residents.").
329 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FAA, 564 F.3d 549, 557 (2d Cir. 2009);
West, 320 F. App'x at 784; City of Oxford, Ga., 428 F.3d at 1354; City of Olmsted
Falls, Ohio v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Grand Canyon Trust,
290 F.3d at 340; Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 89 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc., 90 F.3d at 429-31; City of Grapevine, Tex. v.
DOT, 17 F.3d 1502, 1505-06 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Cmtys., Inc. v. Busey, 956 F.2d 619,
622, 625-26 (6th Cir. 1992); Allison v. DOT, 908 F.2d 1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Town of Rye, N.Y., 907 F.2d at 25; McArtor, 878 F.2d at 177-78; C.A.R.E.
Now, Inc., 844 F.2d at 1572, 1574-75; Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v.
Adams, 680 F.2d 835, 840 (1st Cir. 1982); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman,
518 F.2d 323, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1975); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518
F.2d 322, 322 (9th Cir. 1975); Fla. Clean Water Network, Inc. v. Grosskruger, No.
3:08-cv-120-J-32TEM, 2008 WL 435156, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2008); Airport
Cmtys. Coal. v. Graves, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1228-29 (W.D. Wash. 2003); Califor-
nia, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 974-78; California, 2003 WL 21058179, at *1; Town of
Fairview, Tex. v. U.S. DOT, 201 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72-74 (D.D.C. 2002); California ex
rel. Van de Kamp, 687 F. Supp. at 500; Engen, 665 F. Supp. at 544-45; Suburban
O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 603 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1985); CRAG, 477 F.
Supp. at 1000-05; City of Bos. v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698, 699-700 (D. Mass.
1975); Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Butterfield, 396 F. Supp. 632, 635, 640-41 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. State, 80 P.3d 231, 240 (Alaska 2003); Long
Beach Council of Parents & Teachers, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, No. G040430,
2009 WL 1497505, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2009); Sierra Club v. Town of
Mammoth Lakes, No. C044984, 2005 WL 1492006, at *1, 18-22 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 23, 2005); Berkeley Keep Jets over the Bay Comm. v. Bd. of Port Comm'rs,
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The remaining forty-eight opinions do not address a chal-
lenge to the consideration of environmental impacts.
CAlternative: Fifty-eight of the opinions address a claim that the
agency inadequately considered alternatives to the pro-
posed expansion. In thirty (slightly more than half) of the
fifty-eight cases, the plaintiff alleges that the agency did not
adequately consider all feasible alternatives (CAlternative -
1).330 In twenty-eight of the fifty-eight cases, the plaintiff
claims that the agency was required to demonstrate that
there were no feasible alternatives to the proposed expan-
sion and failed to do so (CAlternative = 2).331 In the majority of
111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, 601 (Ct. App. 2001); Friends of Mammoth v. Town of
Mammoth Lakes Redev. Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 346-50 (Ct. App. 2000);
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. Hensler, 284 Cal. Rptr. 498, 506-08
(Ct. App. 1991); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 779 N.E.2d 875, 886 (Ill.
2002); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 705 N.E.2d 48, 49 (Il1. 1998); People ex
rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 769 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 779 N.E.2d 875 (Il. 2002); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 686 N.E.2d
66, 68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), affd, 705 N.E.2d 48 (I11. 1998); Town of Babylon, 849
N.Y.S.2d at 612; Town of Babylon, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 141; Stewart Park & Reserve Coal.,
555 N.Y.S.2d at 483-86; Town of Babylon, 2006 WL 6102985.
330 See Alliance for Legal Action, 69 F. App'x at 622; City of Alameda, 285 F.3d at
1145 n.3; Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc., 90 F.3d at 428; Cottonwood Grove Dev. Corp.,
952 F.2d 409; Town of Rye, N.Y, 907 F.2d at 25; McArtor, 878 F.2d at 177; Suburban
O'Hare Comm'n, 787 F.2d at 195-96; Matsumoto, 568 F.2d at 1291; la. Clean Water
Network, Inc., 2008 WL 435156, at *1; Airport Cmtys. Coal., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1221;
City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. EPA, 266 F. Supp. 2d 718, 720 (N.D. Ohio 2003),
affPd, 435 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2006); California, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 978 n.10; City of
Taylor, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6865, at *8-9; California ex rel. Van de Kamp, 687 F.
Supp. at 499; Engen, 665 F. Supp. at 543; City of Southlake, 679 F. Supp. at 619;
Suburban O'Hare Comm'n, 603 F. Supp. at 1015; Illinois ex rel. Scott, 396 F. Supp. at
635; City of Romulus, 392 F. Supp. at 585; Town of New Windsor v. Ronan, 329 F.
Supp. 1286, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Long Beach Council of Parents & Teachers, Inc.,
2009 WL 1497505, at *7; Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. Hensler,
233 Cal. App. 3d 577, 585 (Ct. App. 1991); City of Lomita v. City of Torrance, 148
Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1069-70 (Ct. App. 1983); S.F. Ecology Ctr. v. City & Cnty. of
S.F., 48 Cal. App. 3d 584, 595 (Ct. App. 1975); Criscuolo v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., No. CV074014323S, 2008 WL 4635847, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2,
2008); Town of Hull, 806 N.E.2d at 906 n.12; Mass. Port Auth., 2003 WL 23163109,
at *1; Mass. Port Auth., 2003 WL 23163113, at *3; Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands,
590 P.2d 709, 715 (Or. 1979) (en banc); Georgetown Crime Prevention, 2000 WL
1772517, at *1.
331 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 564 F.3d at 556-57; St. John's United
Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 635 (7th Cir. 2007); Vill. of Ben-
senville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2006); City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio, 292
F.3d at 274; Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA, 292 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Town of Stratford, Conn., 285 F.3d at 90; City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 461-62; City of
Grapevine, Tex., 17 F.3d at 1507; Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n, 998 F.2d at 1531;
Cmtys., Inc., 956 F.2d at 627; Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., 938 F.2d at 203; Al-
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cases, CAlternatve = 0 because the opinion does not acknowl-
edge a challenge to the discussion of alternatives.
CMitigate: Seventy-two (slightly more than half) of the opin-
ions address a claim that the agency inadequately consid-
ered mitigation measures. Twelve of the seventy-two cases
address a challenge only to the consideration of potential
mitigation measures (CMitigate - 1-) _332 In twenty-three cases,
the opinion additionally addresses a challenge to the sub-
stantive mitigation measures (CMitiga = 1.5), such as an alle-
gation that the expanded airport will fail to conform to
substantive environmental statutes. 33 In thirty-seven of the
lison, 908 F.2d at 1027-28; C.A.R.E. Now, Inc., 844 F.2d at 1572; Life o] the Land,
485 F.2d at 474; City of Bos. v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 256 n.1 (1st Cir. 1972); Fla.
Clean Water Network, Inc. v. Grosskruger, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1243 (M.D. Fla.
2008); Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n, 2007 WL 495245, at *13; St. John's United
Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899 (N.D. Il1. 2005), affd,
502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007); Alliance for Legal Action v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 314 F. Supp. 2d 534, 543 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Steele Creek Cmty. Ass'n v.
U.S. DOT, 435 F. Supp. 196, 197 (W.D.N.C. 1977), affd, 570 F.2d 346 (4th Cir.
1978); Missouri ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth., 427 F. Supp. at 1258; Life of
the Land, 363 F. Supp. at 1173; Citizens Airport Comm. of Chesterfield Cnty., 351 F.
Supp. at 60; Alaska Ctr. for the Env't, 80 P.3d at 244; Santa Barbara Channelkeeper
v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. B178125, 2005 WL 2660048, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 19, 2005); Sierra Club, 2005 WL 1492006, at *23; Berkeley Keep Jets over the Bay
Comm., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604; City of Goleta v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No.
CIV214036, 2004 WL 5371311, at *4-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004).
332 See Town of Winthrop, 535 F.3d at 6; Ass'n of Citizens to Protect & Pres. the
Env't v. FAA, 287 F. App'x 764, 765 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); City of Ala-
meda, 285 F.3d at 1145 n.3; Cottonwood Grove Dev. Corp., 952 F.2d 409; City of Bos.,
464 F.2d at 256 n.1; City of Taylor, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6865, at *8-9; Fat, 119
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405; Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 284 Cal. Rptr. at 502;
City of Lomita, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 543; S.F. Ecology Ctr., 122 Cal. Rptr. at 107; Miami
Sierra Club, 721 So. 2d at 831; Town of Babylon, 2006 WL 6102985.
333 See United States ex rel. Heath v. Dall.-Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 260 F.
App'x 708, 709 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Karst Envtl. Educ. & Prot., Inc. v.
EPA, 475 F.3d 1291, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Town of Stratford, Conn., 292 F.3d at
253; City of L.A. v. FAA, 138 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 1998); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs
v. FAA, 18 F.3d 953, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision); Save
Ourselves, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 958 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1992);
Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 199 (7th Cir. 1986); Families
for Asbestos Compliance Testing & Safety v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 638 F. Supp.
2d 1117, 1118 (E.D. Mo. 2009); Fla. Clean Water Network, Inc., 2008 WL 435156, at
*1; Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety v. City of St. Louis, Mo.,
No. 3:08-cv-120-J-32TEM, 2008 WL 4279569, at *1 (E.D. Mo. 2008); Black Warrior
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1251 (N.D.
Ala. 2008); United States ex rel. Heath v. Dall./Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., No.
Civ.A.3:99-CV-0100-M, 2004 WL 1197483, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2004); City of Olmsted
Falls, Ohio, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 724 n.3; Town of Fairview, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 66; Save
Ourselves, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 90-637-A, 1991 WiL 398773, at
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seventy-two opinions, the court addresses a claim that the
agency has an absolute duty to minimize environmental im-
pact of the proposed expansion (CMigate = 2).4
A perusal of the briefs and pleadings filed in these cases indi-
cates that plaintiffs typically raise significantly more claims than
are addressed in the court's final opinion.3 3 5 For example, chal-
lenges to the consideration of alternatives or to the discussion of
mitigation measures are brought more frequently than the sta-
tistics above indicate. There may be a tendency for the courts to
*1 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 1991); California ex rel. Van de Kamp, 687 F. Supp. at 501;
Suburban O'Hare Comm'n, 603 F. Supp. at 1020; Sierra Club, 2005 WL 1492006, at
*20; McCain v. Cnty. of Lassen, Nos. C036601, C038265, 2003 WL 123065, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003); Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 012731BLS2,
2004 WL 1588263, at *2-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 26, 2004); Morse, 590 P.2d at
718; Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd,
590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 572 P.2d 1075,
1076-77 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
34 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 564 F.3d at 562-63; City of Olmsted Falls,
Ohio v. EPA, 435 F.3d 632, 636 (6th Cir. 2006); City of OlmstedFalls, Ohio, 292 F.3d
at 274; Town of Stratford, Conn., 285 F.3d at 90; Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
U.S. DOT, 222 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 2000); City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 461;
City of Normandy Park v. Port of Seattle 165 F.3d 35 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpub-
lished table decision); City of Grapevine, Tex., 17 F.3d at 1507; Nat'l Parks & Conser-
vation, 998 F.2d at 1534; Cmtys., Inc., 956 F.2d at 622; Citizens Against Burlington,
Inc., 938 F.2d at 202; Allison, 908 F.2d at 1027; C.A.KE. Now, Inc., 844 F.2d at
1572; Life of the Land, 485 F.2d at 474 n.15; Fla. Clean Water Network, Inc., 587 F.
Supp. 2d at 1243; Nat'l Mitigation Banking Ass'n, 2007 WL 495245, at *6, *18;
Alliance for Legal Action, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 552; Airport Cmtys. Coal., 280 F. Supp.
2d at 1220, 1224; Miron v. Menominee Cnty., 795 F. Supp. 840, 842 (W.D. Mich.
1992); Steele Creek Cmty. Ass'n v. U.S. DOT, 435 F. Supp. 196, 197 (W.D.N.C.
1977), affd, 570 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1978); Petterson v. Froehlke, 354 F. Supp. 45,
48 (D. Or. 1972); Citizens Airport Comm. v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 52, 60 (E.D. Va.
1972); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't, 80 P.3d at 255; Santa Barbara Channelkeeper, 2005
WL 2660048, at *5; Berkeley Keep Jets over the Bay Comm., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
603-04; City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 85 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1999); City of Goleta, 2004 WL 5371311; Save Our Wet-
lands, Inc. (SOWL) v. Orleans Levee Bd., 368 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (La. Ct. App.
1979); Town of Hull, 806 N.E.2d at 905; Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs v. Mass. Port Auth.,
323 N.E.2d 329, 334 (Mass. 1975); City of Bos. v. Mass. Port Auth., 308 N.E.2d
488, 491 n.4, 501 (Mass. 1974); Mass. Port Auth., 2003 WL 23163109, at *1, *3
n.14; Mass. Port Auth., 2003 WL 23163113, at *3; Airport Impact Relief, Inc. v.
Mass. Port Auth., No. 941371B, 1995 WL 809553, at *2 n.5, *5 (Mass. Super. Ct.
June 8, 1995); N.O.I.S.E., Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, C.A. No. 89-175-
II, 1989 Wi. 155923, at *1 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1989); Port of Seattle v.
Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 90 P.3d 659, 691 (Wash. 2004); City of Des
Moines v. Puget Sound Reg'l Council, 988 P.2d 27, 35 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
335 See, e.g., Life of the Land, 363 F. Supp. at 1174 ("Without attempting an ex-
haustive discussion of each of the matters as to which plaintiffs argue that the EIS
is deficient, I shall illustrate the three categories mentioned.").
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consolidate all challenges to an environmental review into an
evaluation of the adequacy of the discussion of environmental
impacts. If so, this would be inconsistent with the directive of
NEPA's implementing regulations that the discussion of alterna-
tives, and not the consideration of environmental impacts, "is
the heart of the environmental impact statement." '336 Neverthe-
less, if an issue such as consideration of alternatives or discus-
sion of mitigation measures is not addressed or acknowledged in
the court's opinion, for the purposes of this study, that parame-
ter is coded to a value of zero, without regard to whether the
issue was actually part of the plaintiffs complaint or raised in
the plaintiff's brief.
Finally, the outcome parameter 0Outcome is coded according to
Table 4 to reflect the degree of success of the environmental
challenge. In eighteen cases, the plaintiff actually obtains an in-
junction or similar ruling (such as overturning the required
agency approval) that halts the expansion activity (Ooucome = 4)
usually pending supplementation of the environmental re-
view.33 7 In three cases, the court orders supplementation of the
environmental review but expressly declines to issue an injunc-
tion (Ooutcome = 3).338 In nine cases, the court declines to order
formal supplementation of the environmental review, but it con-
ditions approval on the completion of some minimal additional
compliance, such as securing a permit or providing additional
documentation of its environmental analysis (OOutcome = 2).3 In
336 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2010).
337 See Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Nat'I
Parks & Conservation Ass'n, 998 F.2d at 1533; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brine-
gar, 518 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1975); California v. U.S. DOT, 260 F. Supp. 2d
969, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2003); California v. U.S. DOT, Nos. C02-4621 BZ, C02-4623
BZ, 2003 WL 21058179, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2003); California ex rel. Van de
Kamp, 687 F. Supp. at 501; Citizens for Responsible Area Growth (CRAG) v. Ad-
ams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 1007 (D.N.H. 1979); City of Romulus v. Cnty. of Wayne,
392 F. Supp. 578, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1975), vacated, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980);
McCain, 2003 WL 123065, at *5; Berkeley Keep Jets over the Bay Comm., 111 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 602; Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment
Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 339 (Ct. App. 2000); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Air-
port Auth., 284 Cal. Rptr. at 509; Miami Sierra Club, 721 So. 2d at 830; Philip v.
Daley, 790 N.E.2d 961, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), vacated sub nom., Daley v. Hutch-
inson, 2003 WL 23610572 (Sept. 9, 2003); Secy of Envtl. Affairs, 323 N.E.2d at 344;
Morse, 590 P.2d at 715; Morse, 581 P.2d at 528; Morse, 572 P.2d at 1078.
338 See City of Atlanta v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 506, 511 (N.D. Ga. 1982);
City of Bos. v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698, 701 (D. Mass. 1975); Price v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 650 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (App. Div. 1996).
339 See City of Grapevine, Tex., 17 F.3d at 1509; Citizens Against Burlington, Inc.,
938 F.2d at 206; Missouri ex rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v. Coleman,
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nine cases, the plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss or a sum-
mary judgment motion, but a final decision is not reached, and
thus, no further environmental review is ordered (Ooutcome =
1).',40 Thirty-two of the cases are dismissed due to jurisdictional
or other justiciability concerns, without reaching the merits of
the plaintiff's claims (Ooutcome = -1).1 41 In the remaining sixty-
427 F. Supp. 1252, 1263 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom., Missouri ex
rel. Mo.-St. Louis Metro. Airport Auth. v. Adams, 564 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(unpublished table decision); City of L.A. v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 547, 557
(D.D.C. 1975); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 705 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ill. 1998);
People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 686 N.E.2d 66, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), affd,
705 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. 1998); Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 012731BLS2, 2004
WL 1588263, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004); Mass. Port Auth., 2003 WL 23163113,
at *17; City of Des Moines, 988 P.2d at 34.
340 See Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety v. City of St. Louis,
Mo., No. 4:05-CV-719 (CEJ), 2008 WL 4279569, at *31 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 15, 2008);
Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 561 F. Supp. 2d
1250, 1255-56 (N.D. Ala. 2008); United States ex rel. Heath v. Dall./Fort Worth
Int'l Airport Bd., No. Civ.A.3:99-CV-0100-M, 2004 WL 1197483, at *9 (N.D. Tex.
2004); State ex rel. Scott v. Butterfield, 396 F. Supp. 632, 646 (N.D. I11. 1975); City
of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 37
(Ct. App. 1999); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi., 769 N.E.2d 84, 92 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, 779 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2002); City of Bos. v. Mass.
Port Auth., 308 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Mass. 1974); Airport Impact Relief, Inc. v. Mass.
Port Auth., No. 941371B, 1995 WL 809553, at *10 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 8,
1995); Sutton v. Yates Cnty., 598 N.Y.S.2d 646, 647 (App. Div. 1993).
341 See Ass'n of Citizens to Protect & Pres. the Env't v. FAA, 287 F. App'x 764,
765 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of
Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 620, 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2007); Karst Envtl. Educ. & Prot., Inc.
v. EPA, 475 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA, 457
F.3d 52, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Heide v. FAA, 110 F. App'x 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2004)
(per curiam); Comm. to Stop Airport Expansion v. FAA, 320 F.3d 285, 287 (2d
Cir. 2003); Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA, 292 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
City of Alameda v. FAA, 285 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002); Town of Stratford,
Conn. v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Citizen Advocacy Ctr. v. DuPage
Airport Auth., 141 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 1998); Sutton v. U.S. DOT, 38 F.3d
621, 626 (2d Cir. 1994); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 958
F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1992); Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Env't, Inc.
v. McArtor, 878 F.2d 174, 179 (6th Cir. 1989); Cnty. of Orange v. Air Cal., 799
F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986); City of Romulus v. Cnty. of Wayne, 634 F.2d 347,
349 (6th Cir. 1980); City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709, 713 (6th Cir.
1979); City of Bos. v. Brinegar, 512 F.2d 319, 320 (1st Cir. 1975); Citizens Comm.
for the Columbia River v. Callaway, 494 F.2d 124, 126 (9th Cir. 1974); City of Bos.
v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 260 (1st Cir. 1972); Families for Asbestos Compliance
Testing & Safety v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 638 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1125 (E.D. Mo.
2009); Ass'n of Citizens to Protect & Pres. the Env't v. FAA, No. 2:07-cv-378-MEF,
2007 WL 3205974, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 31, 2007), affd, 287 F. App'x 764 (11th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam); St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 401 F.
Supp. 2d 887, 896, 903, 905, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2005), affd, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.
2007); Town of Fairview, Tex. v. U.S. DOT, 201 F. Supp. 2d 64, 77 (D.D.C. 2002);
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nine opinions (roughly one-half of the opinions), the court con-
siders the plaintiffs claims on the merits and denies relief (Oou-
come = 0), ruling in favor of the agency or airport sponsor.342
Table 4. Coding scheme to represent the disposition of
a case (Foutcome).
Outcome of Decision Ooutcome Value
Injunction (Construction Halted) 4
Supplementation Required 3
Disclosure Required 2
Survives Dismissal/Summary Judgment I
Unsuccessful Claim 0
Not Justiciable/No Jurisdiction -1
B. REGRESSION RESULTS
1. All Cases
Regression results for all 140 cases are displayed in Table 5.
The initial regression analysis of all'parameters is displayed in
Row Al. This analysis illustrates the influence of the three pri-
mary NEPA procedural challenges (Chnpact, CAlternative, CMitigate), fac-
tors related to the challenged activity (FExpand, Fstage, FReiew), and
factors related to the decision itself (Fcourt, FDate) with respect to
the success of the environmental challenge. Interestingly, the
stage of development challenged (Fsuge) is shown to be an insig-
nificant factor (t = 0.69). In other words, environmental chal-
lenges brought at the speculative planning stage are not
significantly more or less likely to succeed than attempts to en-
City of Taylor v. Bussey, No. 90-CV-71452-DT, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6865, at *25
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 1991); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No.
90-637-A, 1991 WL 398773, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 1991); City of Southlake v.
FAA, 679 F. Supp. 618, 621-22 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v.
Dole, 603 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Criscuolo v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., No. CV074014323S, 2008 WL 4635847, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2,
2008); Mass. Port Auth. v. City of Bos., No. 0102731BLS2, 2003 WiL 23163109, at
*9-10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003); Twp. of Hanover v. Town of Morristown,
343 A.2d 792, 794, 796 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Gorman v. Town Bd., 709
N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (App. Div. 2000); City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. Jones, 787
N.E.2d 669, 673 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
342 A previous study of "most of the cases concerning airport and airspace ex-
pansion" concluded that "the opinions resulting in favorable outcomes for the
agencies outnumber those opposed by more than four to one." Tom Neuhoff,
Jr., Obstacles to Increasing Airspace-Jumping Through Environmental Law Hoops, 58 J.
AIRL. & COM. 221, 246 (1992). That study considered sixteen cases. Id. at 246 n.
162. The present study of 140 cases reveals a moderately better success rate for
opponents of airport expansion.
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join the use of a recently expanded airport. 43 Therefore, this
parameter is removed from consideration in subsequent
regressions.
Results from the second iterative regression are displayed in
Row A2. This indicates that a challenge to the consideration of
alternatives (CAlternative) has an insignificant influence on the out-
come of a case (t = 0.71). This may seem surprising in as much
as the alternatives analysis is considered the "heart" of the NEPA
review process, but it is consistent with the qualitative observa-
tions of previous commentators that courts are particularly def-
erential to an agency's alternatives analysis when it comes to
airport expansion. Despite NEPA's requirement to consider all
feasible alternatives to meet the agency's objectives, courts will
approve the environmental review of an airport expansion pro-
ject when the only alternatives considered are the proposed de-
velopment and no project. M4 Furthermore, it is not evident that
courts give any significant consideration to language of other
applicable statutes requiring the agency to determine that there
is no possible, prudent, feasible, or practicable alternative to the
proposed expansion. Therefore, this parameter is removed
from consideration in subsequent regressions.
Row A3 contains the final regression analysis of all remaining
parameters in all the cases considered for this study. All remain-
ing parameters are statistically significant (t > 1). The most sig-
nificant parameter (t = 4.02) is a challenge brought to the
agency's consideration of environmental impacts (Cimpact). The
positive magnitude of the regression coefficient (0.613) indi-
cates that a challenge to the discussion of environmental im-
pacts is practically required in order for the plaintiff to obtain
any relief. Furthermore, the plaintiff challenging the airport ex-
pansion can significantly improve its chance of relief by formu-
lating its complaint as a challenge to the discussion of
secondary, indirect, or (most effectively) cumulative impacts of
the airport expansion. Courts appear most likely to be suspi-
cious of attempts by airports to expand in an incremental, seg-
mented, or piecemeal fashion.
343 But see Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250, 1272 (1st Cir.
1996) ("' [B]ureaucratic decision makers ... are less likely to tear down a nearly
completed project than a barely started project."' (quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh,
872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989)).
344 Hartmann, supra note 29, at 738-40.
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Table 5. Regression results (absolute t-statistics in
parentheses) for all cases (sample size = 140), with
insignificant parameters iteratively removed.
Iteration Intercept Cimpa- CAhtematie CMitigate FExpad Fs gc FR,j_ Fc , I FDa-.
Al 1.531 0.641 -0.128 0.270 0.117 -0.071 -0.221 -0.515 -0.212
(2.58) (4.09) (0.71) (1.74) (1.36) (0.69) (2.04) (3.46) (2.09)
A2 1.310 0.637 -0.129 0.267 0.124 -0.222 -0.529 -0.212
(2.62) (4.07) (0.71) (1.73) (1.46) (2.06) (3.59) (2.09)
A3 1.369 0.613 0.235 0.118 -0.249 -0.543 -0.205
(2.78) (4.02) (1.59) (1.40) (2.45) (3.72) (2.04)
Interestingly, the second most significant parameter (t = 3.72)
in these cases is not related to the form of the environmental
challenge, but rather to which court is reviewing it (Fcourt). The
large negative coefficient for this parameter (-0.543) indicates
that a federal court is much more likely than a state court to
uphold or approve the agency's environmental review, and the
U.S. courts of appeals are much more likely than the U.S. dis-
trict courts to uphold the agency's review. This indicates that
federal statutes preempting control of airport environmental
regulation and granting exclusive jurisdiction to the U.S. courts
of appeals may be more determinative than NEPA in determin-
ing the outcome of an environmental challenge. Because of the
December 2003 change to the Federal Aviation Act, granting ex-
clusive jurisdiction to the U.S. courts of appeals for challenges
to practically all, FAA orders, 4 it is highly unlikely today that
opponents of airport expansion will prevail in a NEPA challenge
against the FAA. In order to have a realistic chance of delaying
airport expansion pending further environmental review, oppo-
nents of airport expansion should attempt to bring a state court
challenge, preferably under a "little NEPA" statute, or challenge
the action of some agency other than the FAA, such as USACE,
in order to have the challenge heard in a U.S. district court.34 6
However, due to increased coordination of the environmental
review process in recent years, mandated by the December 2003
enactment of Vision 100,311 the FAA is likely to be the agency
345 See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
346 See Mergen, supra note 40, at 23 ("Although review of FAA orders has
largely been limited to the courts of appeal, challenges to Corps of Engineers'
permits may be brought in the district court, making the FAA and sponsors more
vulnerable to injunctive relief.").
347 Id. at 23 & n.17.
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ultimately responsible for environmental review, denying airport
opponents the opportunity to sue USACE.
The influence of other factors is less significant but worth not-
ing. The coefficient for FDate is negative (-0.205), indicating that
environmental challenges to airport expansion have become sig-
nificantly less likely to succeed over time since the 1970 enact-
ment of NEPA. Also, the coefficient for FRviCw is negative
(-0.249), indicating, intuitively, that courts are more likely to
uphold the agency's review where the agency has prepared an
EIS rather than issued a FONSI. 34 s Also intuitively, the coeffi-
cient for FExpand is positive (0.118), indicating that courts are
somewhat less likely to defer to an agency's environmental re-
view when the proposed expansion is major (e.g., a new airport
can be expected to receive more judicial scrutiny than a new
taxiway at an existing airport).
One additional significant factor in the outcome of these
cases is also one of the three major NEPA prongs: a challenge to
the mitigation plan (CMitigate). Although not as significant as a
challenge to the consideration of environmental impacts, the
positive magnitude of the regression coefficient for CMifgte
(0.235) indicates that courts are sympathetic to arguments that
the agency has inadequately discussed ways to mitigate the envi-
ronmental consequences. It also indicates that environmental
plaintiffs are even more likely to persuade courts to mandate
additional environmental review if they can demonstrate that
there is an applicable non-NEPA statute that establishes substan-
tive requirements to actually implement mitigation measures.
In particular, an agency's environmental review is more likely
to be overturned if plaintiffs can demonstrate that there is an
applicable statute that requires environmental impacts to be
minimized. These "near-total mitigation" challenges have a much
higher success rate in state court (under a state "little NEPA"
statute) than when brought in federal court under a specialized
federal statute, such as section 4(f) of the DOT Act (which re-
quires "all possible planning to minimize harm to the park, rec-
reation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site
resulting from the use" of the site by a transportation develop-
348 It has long been speculated that completing an EIS provides some "insula-
tion" for the challenged agency, which may make the difference "in a close case."
Id. at 22-23 (concluding that the "most responsible" factor in a court's decision
to overturn the FAA's environmental review "was the FAA's decision to prepare
an EA rather than an EIS for the replacement airport project" (discussing Grand
Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2002))).
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ment project) 49 However, environmental plaintiffs to date
have not significantly exploited the nearly identical language in
the AAJA, which requires "that every reasonable step has been
taken to minimize the adverse effect" of airport expansion.350
This analysis indicates that a "near-total mitigation" challenge is
statistically effective, and environmental plaintiffs may be able to
leverage the successful state court "little NEPA" challenges as
persuasive authority to argue that a given FAA-funded airport
expansion fails to minimize environmental impact.
The final regression analysis of all cases, displayed in Row A3,
could be represented as the following equation:
Oo.c,,e, = 1.369 + 0.613 • Crnp, + 0.235 • CMiigate + 0.118 • FE.pand
- 0.249 • FR,-, 0.543 • Fc, - 0.205 • FD.,
For a case in 2010 (FDate 4) in a U.S. court of appeals (Fcor,rt
3), this equation reduces to:
Oout.ome = -1.080 + 0.613 • Gmpa + 0.235 • CMi,igate + 0.118 • FEp nd
- 0.249 • FRel,
For a challenge to a runway extension (FExpand = 3) where a
final EIS has been issued (FReview = 3), the equation reduces fur-
ther to:
Out,,0e = -1.472 + 0.613 • mpact + 0.235 • Cjlitigte
This illustrates the fact that most challenges today in the U.S.
courts of appeals will be unsuccessful, and it will be critical for
the challenger to both allege that the environmental review
failed to assess cumulative impacts and also to invoke a statute
requiring the agency to actively minimize the consequences of
the proposed expansion. Merely challenging the discussion in
the EIS of environmental impacts (CImpa = 1) and mitigation
measures (CMitigae = 1) results in an expected value of Ooutcome -
-0.624, which indicates a tendency toward early dismissal on jus-
ticiability grounds. However, alleging that cumulative impacts
were inadequately considered (Clmpact = 2) and that the agency
has failed to ensure minimization of the environmental impacts
349 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006); see Christian, supra note 220, at 615 ("[Section] 4(f)
has never been applied to prevent the construction of a new airport or to even
curtail the expansion of an existing airport located near an environmentally-sen-
sitive park.").
350 49 U.S.C. § 47106.
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(CMitigate = 2) results in an expected value of Ootcome = 0.223,
which indicates a tendency toward having the challenge consid-
ered on its merits.
The same factual setting in state court (Fcourt = 1) would result
in the following equation:
Oouco,, = -0.386 + 0.613 - Qmpact + 0.235 " Cmitigae
Therefore, alleging in state court that cumulative impacts
were inadequately considered (Cmpact = 2) and that environmen-
tal impacts must be minimized (CMitigate = 2) results in an ex-
pected value of OOutcome = 1.309, indicating a slight tendency
toward granting the challenger some modest relief, although it
is still unlikely that courts will enjoin expansion or even require
the agency to formally supplement its environmental review.
2. Justiciable Cases
Because the initial regression indicated that the reviewing
court had such a strong influence on the outcome of a chal-
lenge, it was hypothesized that this might reflect the influence
of federal statutes preempting state control over airport expan-
sion and placing original jurisdiction in the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals. In order to isolate and eliminate any bias arising from
dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, the regression was repeated,
after first removing cases that were dismissed on justiciability
grounds and considering only the remaining 108 cases. These
results are displayed in Table 6.
Interestingly, the results do not change dramatically. As for
the three major NEPA prongs, challenges to the discussion of
environmental impact (Clmpact) and the mitigation plan (CMitigte)
are still significant factors in the outcome, whereas a challenge
to the alternatives analysis (CAternafive) is not. The reviewing
court (Fco,,urt), the date of decision (FDate), and the magnitude of
the planned expansion (FExpand) are all significant factors, and
the stage of completion (Fsage) is not. Interestingly, the most
statistically significant factor in this reduced sample of cases is
the level of environmental review performed (FRiew). The mag-
nitude of its negative coefficient (-0.366) confirms that courts
are much more likely to uphold an EIS than a FONSI.
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Table 6. Regression results (absolute t-statistics in
parentheses) for all justiciable cases (sample size = 108), with
insignificant parameters iteratively removed.
Iteration Intercept Cl~paa C Cmig_ FExpad Fsa I FRC,ew Fco.r FDa,
BI 1.642 0.430 -0.134 0.253 0.135 -0.036 -0.342 -0.349 -0.146
(2.49) (2.05) (0.61) (1.30) (1.38) (0.28) (2.56) (1.88) (1.20)
B2 1.544 0.430 -0.137 0.250 0.139 -0.343 -0.359 -0.148
(2.76) (2.06) (0.63) (1.30) (1.44) (2.57) (1.98) (1.23)
B3 1.614 0.391 0.205 0.129 -0.366 -0.368 -0.137
(2.95) (1.97) (1.15) (1.35) (2.87) (2.04) (1.14)
Row B3 contains the final regression analysis of all statistically
significant parameters in the reduced set of justiciable cases.
Row B3 could be expressed as the following equation:
Outcome = 1.614 + 0.391 • Cmpact + 0.205 - Citigate + 0.129 " FExpand
- 0.366 -FRevi - 0.368 " Fcou, - 0.136 FDate
For a case in 2010 (FDate = 4) in a U.S. court of appeals (Fcourt =
3), this equation reduces to:
O0uto,,. = -0.033 + 0.391 • Cimpact + 0.205 - CMitigate + 0.129 • FEp,,,d
- 0.366 • FR,,i..
For a challenge to a runway extension (FExpand = 3) based on cu-
mulative environmental impacts (Ch.pact = 2) and failure to mini-
mize environmental impacts (CMiigat = 2), the equation reduces
further to:
Oo.,,o,,, = 1.544 - 0.366 • FRVimw
Again, this confirms the fact that most challenges today in the
U.S. courts of appeals are expected to be unsuccessful, particu-
larly where the agency has gone to the trouble of completing a
final EIS. Where the agency has issued a final EIS and ROD
(FRe,1 w = 3), this equation results in an expected value of 0Oucome
= 0.446, indicating that the challenge is expected to be unsuc-
cessful, although the slight positive magnitude indicates a ten-
dency toward the challenge surviving motions for dismissal or
summary judgment. However, where the agency has only issued
a FONSI (FReview = 1), it results in an expected value of 0 utcome =
1.178, indicating that the challenge is likely to be heard on the
merits, and there is a slight tendency toward granting the chal-
lenger some modest relief, although it is still unlikely that courts
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will enjoin expansion or even require the agency to supplement
its environmental review.
The same factual setting in state court (Fcourt = 1) would result
in the following equation:
Oouicome = 2.279 - 0.366 ' FRein
indicating an even stronger tendency toward relief in state
court, particularly where the agency has issued a FONSI rather
than prepared an EIS.
V. CONCLUSION
Successful environmental challenges to airport expansion are
infrequent and have become increasingly unlikely over time
since the passage of NEPA. If the challenge is heard in the U.S.
courts of appeals, it is highly likely that the agency's environ-
mental review will be upheld. In order to have a substantial
chance of delaying airport expansion pending further environ-
mental review, opponents of airport expansion must attempt to
bring a state court challenge under a "little NEPA" statute, or
challenge the action of some agency other than the FAA, such as
the USACE, in order to have the challenge heard in a U.S. dis-
trict court. However, congressional legislation passed in 2003
calls for other federal or state agencies to participate in a coordi-
nated review process under the direction of the FAA and grants
exclusive jurisdiction to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for chal-
lenges to practically all FAA actions . 51 This could have the ef-
fect of consolidating all NEPA challenges in the U.S. courts of
appeals, where it is highly unlikely that opponents of airport ex-
pansion can prevail.
This study demonstrates the most effective legal arguments
for airport expansion opponents who find themselves facing
such a difficult judicial forum. Specifically, environmental
plaintiffs should focus their efforts on challenging the FAA's dis-
cussion of cumulative environmental impacts (required by
NEPA), and to a lesser degree, on challenging the FAA's failure
to ensure that environmental impacts will be minimized (re-
quired by AAIA). Although they still face an uphill battle, the
occasional victory for environmental plaintiffs can be dispropor-
tionately costly for proponents of airport expansion, if the FAA
is required to perform supplemental environmental review and
351 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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airport proprietors are required to delay their plans and renego-
tiate existing contracts pending supplementation. Therefore,
this more focused approach to effective airport environmental
litigation should ultimately encourage airport expansion propo-
nents to perform a more thorough environmental review earlier
in time, to avoid the possibility of an unfavorable court decision.
From the FAA's perspective, even where significant environ-
mental impacts are not anticipated, the agency should consider
the incremental expense of preparing an EIS rather than a
FONSI. The EA itself is often a major undertaking today, and
the additional review required for an EIS may be nominal when
measured against the significantly increased likelihood of court
approval of an EIS. This is especially true when one recognizes
that, in the context of airport expansion, courts have not strictly
required the FAA to consider all possible alternatives in its EIS.
For the most part, a comparison of the impact of the proposed
expansion with the "no project" alternative will satisfy the court.
Agency resources that have historically been focused on provid-
ing a superficial analysis of multiple alternatives could instead
be more effectively focused on providing an in-depth analysis of
the environmental impacts and potential mitigation measures
for only two alternatives: the proposed expansion and no
project.
On that note, it is most important for the FAA, in its EIS, to
proactively address potential claims that the agency has inade-
quately considered cumulative impacts. This study demon-
strates that courts are particularly sympathetic to allegations that
an airport is being expanded in an incremental, segmented, or
piecemeal fashion to avoid detailed environmental review.
Once again, issuance of a full EIS rather than a FONSI goes a
long way toward alleviating this concern, since it evidences a
willingness on the FAA's part to subject the cumulative history of
development at the airport to environmental scrutiny. Agencies
should not shy away from a presentation of the cumulative envi-
ronmental impact of the expanded airport, particularly since
the baseline for the court's comparison will be the "no project"
alternative, which will also include the cumulative environmen-
tal impact of all developments that preceded the proposed ex-
pansion. The cumulative impact of the proposed expansion
may often compare favorably with the "no project" alternative.
The remaining wild card that should concern the FAA, in its
preparation of the EIS, is to proactively address any potential
claim that the agency or airport has a substantive requirement
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to mitigate the environmental consequences of the planned ex-
pansion. This challenge has historically arisen only in isolated
contexts: where a state "little NEPA" statute imposes a require-
ment to minimize harm to the environment, or in special cir-
cumstances where a federal statute imposes a similar
requirement (e.g., to minimize the impact to a national park
located near the airport). However, this form of environmental
challenge is almost always available, at least with regard to feder-
ally funded airport developments, due to language in AAIA re-
quiring "that every reasonable step has been taken to minimize
the adverse effect" of an expanded airport.3 52 As the agency re-
sponsible for both funding and environmental review of airport
expansion, the FAA is in position to condition the approval of
federal funding on the airport's actual implementation of miti-
gation measures identified in the EIS. Courts would probably
look favorably upon such good-faith efforts to minimize environ-
mental harm and would likely determine that the conditional
approval satisfies the AAIA statutory requirement. Presumably,
environmental organizations also would be less likely to resort to
litigation if the FAA began to take that statutory requirement
more seriously.
However, in order to reach that stage, environmental plain-
tiffs must first readjust their litigation strategy to make the most
effective use of NEPA and similar environmental statutes in the
airport expansion context. By emphasizing the most statistically
significant aspects of an environmental challenge to airport ex-
pansion, this historically ineffective challenge could be reinvigo-
rated. The result should be a more equal balance between
expansion of airport capacity and preservation of the local envi-
ronment, which is the type of outcome that NEPA was always
intended to produce.
3_52 49 U.S.C. § 47106.
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